From the Mouths of Babes

The_Chieftain: We’re going to stay in the North African Theater of Operations for this one, with a couple of commentaries from American Lieutenants on the matter of Tank Destroyers. Lieutenants are, of course, the whipping boys of the Army. How many movies have you seen that the lieutenant is actually competent and reliable? It seems that always they are lost, confused, overeager, detached from reality, and frequently incapacitated while requiring the grizzled old sergeant to fix the situation. Of course, the reality is that they’re just as good as anyone else with similar experience levels, and their observations are not without merit. I used to be one myself, after all.   Insignia of the 40th Infantry Division. Known as "Twelve Lieutenants Pointing North" We’ll start off with a fairly straightforward summary of an interview with a Lt. Louis A Romani, as found in the Tank Destroyer Board archives. Quote follows: 1.            General                 This officer served as an enlisted man and as a platoon leader with the 701st TD Battalion in the African and Italian Campaigns. He received his training at Fort Knox, Kentucky for six months and went overseas in May 1942, where he remained for thirty-four months. He received a battlefield promotion during the African Campaign. The 701st TD Battalion was equipped with M-3s and M-10s. 2.            Employment of the Battalion.                 The battalion was primarily used on secondary missions as reinforcing artillery and, as such, fired harassing fire TOT. They were also used against pillboxes, fortified houses and in close support of infantry with both direct and indirect fire. 3.            Close support of infantry and tanks.                 As a rule, one platoon of TDs was attached to each infantry company. In these cases, the platoon usually remained in a position in readiness where indirect fire positions were prepared. When targets were located by the infantry, they moved forward to prepared positions with hull defilade and took the targets under fire. After completing firing, they again returned to the indirect fire positions.                 The unit felt that the knocking out of AT guns was not a mission for TDs and therefore, would not usually engage them, but left them for the tanks to dispose of. 4.            Primary Mission.                 In operating against enemy armor, wherever it was possible, destroyers were sited in depth with two guns in the center and one on each side, the latter in flanking fire positions.                 It was found that the M-10 was very effective against Mark V and Mark VI tanks and the Ferdinand self-propelled gun, up to a range of 1,000 yards, with the best range between 400 and 800 yards.                 This unit trained their gunners to shoot just short of the tank on rocky ground so that the round would bounce into the tank from underneath. 5              Pillboxes.                 It was found that APC ammunition was very effective against concrete and hardened steel pillboxes. These were taken under fire at ranges from 500 to 800 yards and on the average of ten to fifteen rounds were sufficient to reduce the pillbox.                 Normal procedure was to assign two guns to a pillbox from positions which were not close together and control them by radio. Both guns then fired on a predetermined point which usually was the center of the pillbox. 6              Indirect fire                 In indirect fire, this unit was employed both by company and by platoon. When employed as a platoon they operated their own FDC. When operating as a company, the artillery sometimes operated the FDC and at other times it was operated by company headquarters. Most of their missions were TOT harassing fires. 6.            (Yes, the document miscounted). Night Fire.                 The infantry usually designated, during the day, the target to be engaged at night and in many cases this allowed eight hours for reconnaissance and the location of positions and determination of range. At night the TDs (usually two guns) occupied predetermined positions, kept their motors running and notified the infantry when they were in position. The infantry then illuminated the target by flares and the TDs fired as many rounds as possible very rapidly and then withdrew before the enemy artillery came down on their positions. In at least one case, sixty rounds were fired by one gun in this manner. 7              Against personnel.                 In some instances, TDs were used in direct fire against personnel and it was found that best results were obtained by using HE with fuse delay and aiming just short of the infantry which caused an air-burst about ten feet over the enemy. 8.            Replacements.                 Replacements were received from all branches of the service, some coming from TDRTC. These replacements were better trained and more efficient than those received from other branches. 9.            Battalion Commander                 Battalion commander and his staff served to co-ordinate supply and as a special staff officer on the staff of the divisional commander. 10.          Reconnaissance Personnel.                 Reconnaissance personnel did little or no reconnaissance for the unit due to the static situation. They were used mainly with infantry as security detachments and at times held a part of the front line. 11.          Security                 This battalion was streamlined and the security personnel were practically eliminated. Those that were left were used as replacements in the gun companies.                 When TDs were operating with infantry of (sic) tank units security was provided for them by such units, but it was found by this officer that unless the TDs were actually needed by some other unit, no consideration was given to local security of TDs. 12           Relief                 Due to the static situation, a mobile reserve was usually held out; therefore, the TDs actually in combat were able to be withdrawn by platoon or by company and given three or four days about once a month for maintenance, rest and training in a rest area. 13           Mechanical Failures                 None 14           Spare parts                 There was little call for replacement of spare parts in the vehicles of this battalion. Divisional ordnance had approximately one company in excess destroyers and as they were in need for replacements, the destroyer was replaced by another entire vehicle. 15           Personal Belongings                 Personal belongings were kept in a pool in the battalion area under a guard from their own unit. 16           Ammunition load.                 Ammunition was loaded on the decks of the destroyers and in every available space so that there was no certain load. Approximately one third of the ammunition carried was AP or APC (Whatever was available) and two-thirds HE. 17           Communications.                 The communications within this officer’s unit are described as fair; within the platoon they were good. While the company headquarters could reach the platoon, the platoon could not reach the company. It was found that while the SCR 610 worked very well when tested, the range was not over 1,000 yards after moving over rough terrain.                 When working with the Infantry, this platoon was furnished with the SCR 300 for communication with the supporting unit.                 In static positions, wire was laid to the gun and the remote control unit was used.                 In indirect fire positions, wire was laid to the FDC.   Transcript ends. Now, I’m not sure that having to knock out enemy armour by ricocheting from the ground is the ideal solution to a problem, but I guess one cannot argue with success. This probably should be taken as a reminder that the German cats were not a surprise to the US Army when they were finally encountered in France: However, the lads waiting in the UK to cross the Channel simply knew “Our colleagues in NATOUSA have met the Panther and it seems we can deal with it when it shows up.” It seems reasonable to conclude that they weren’t aware of the more detailed reports coming in from Fifth Army, which I’ll get into in a future article. A memo cover sheet was found next to the above interview summary, and as it covered the same area and time period, I’ll digress to it. It may not have been by a Lieutenant. Transcript begins:                 Col RCM (Ray Calhoun Montgomery, TD Board President)                 As a result of interview with an officer who was with the 1st Inf. Div. and who saw action from Nov 10, 1942 to 10 March 1944 at Oran, El Guettar, Sicily, Salerno, Cassino, and Anzio Beachhead, following items of interest are passed on to TD Board members:                 1.            In Italy, an effective team composed of engineers, infantry and one tank destroyer has been used against German pill boxes. A small patrol, perhaps 1 platoon of engineers and 1 platoon of infantry, moves forward at night toward enemy pill box. Engineers make a path thru mines. Arriving at a point where aerial photograph indicates probable location of pill-box, patrol listens in darkness to hear enemy personnel talking, or in some other way determines the exact location of pill-box. Spot is then marked by a stake, a chalked cross, or by reference to some rock or tree. Patrol then retires to base. Next day the infantry platoon leader guides an M10 along the path cleared thru the minefield. Infantry- man rides in M10fighting compartment with the TD crew. Arriving within 75 yds. of the pill-box, camouflaged pill-box cannot be seen by the M10 crew.But the infantryman nevertheless sights the gun directly on it, using asreference the stake or rock or chalkmark he made the night before. Pill-box is then destroyed by one shot fired point blank at 75 yd. range. Significance: Teamwork.  2.            In Tunisia, an infantry unit was dug in behind a hill and saw about 50 German tanks attacking them. Friendly artillery was laying indirect fire on the tanks but failed to stop them. Infantry then looked back and saw M10s approaching from the rear. But the infantry had not been oriented as to existence of M10s and thought that these were some strange variety of German or Italian tanks. They seemed to be completely surrounded by enemy tanks. Then the M10s took firing positions and amazed theinfantry by promptly destroying eleven enemy tanks and causing remainder to immediate withdraw. Interviewed officer was wounded at this action. He states that in subsequent similar actions, infantry not only recognized the M10s but broke into cheers at their approach. Significance, however is that troops must be taught to recognize friendly units before the battle, and not during it.  3. Interviewed infantry officer tells of effective use made of phosphorous shells fired from 4.2 inch mortars. States that shellswere fired by chemical Bn and had the effect of incendiary bombs, burning everything they touched. States that captured Germans had skin burns from these phosphorous shells, and seemed to have been demoralised by them.  4. Attached are two photographs ta.ken by interviewed officer at Anzio Beachead.                 a. An M10 of the 601 TD Bn which had run over a German mine and overturned. Crew was unhurt. M10 was later recovered and re-employed.                  b. An M10 of the 601 TD Bn at Anzio, still equipped with exhaust and intake vents used for disembarkation in turret-deep water. This M10 landed successfully at H plus 3 hours.   Transcript ends. Of course, the attached photographs apparently had been un-attached over the intervening sixty years. We’ll be coming back to TDs at Anzio in a future article, actually.                  So we’re going to go back a little bit to August of 1943, with a letter by a wounded lieutenant addressed to the Tank Destroyer Board. Transcript begins:                  On Friday, July 30, I had the honor of meeting Major Wood, and had the further privilege of seeing the expression of your thoughts with regard to appropriate equipment for tank destroyer units. [Chieftain’s thought: On a totally unrelated matter, I am frequently struck, as I read documentation from the archives, as to how the art of writing appears to have been lost over the past few decades. Even notes from junior enlisted personnel are written with a vocabulary and mannerism which is rare to find today.] The trend of your thoughts, if I am to understand correctly what Major Wood told me, and if I am to interpret properly the equipment I saw, is that life protecting armor is desirable only if speed is not sacrificed.                  The battles of Tunisia demonstrated to us in the 601st TD Bn that speed was not so important. While the half tracks left much to be desired in speed, especially in the spurts of speed demanded of the last vehicles in a column on a road march, what we lacked was armor and maneuverability. Except, perhaps, in the November stage of the Tunisian fight, no battles were lost, to my knowledge, because our vehicles lacked the speed to get them to the scene of action. In every case we maintained a reserve of speed which we were not able to use because of traffic or mud conditions. For example, our arrival at Kasserine Pass after the Germans broke through in February was delayed by several hours by those conditions, and not as a result of the limitations of our machines.                  On the other hand, many battles were lost because our half tracks could not withstand the withering fire of a long-barrelled 75. Our men did not call the half-tracks a “Purple Heart Box” for nothing. The only thing that could have saved us Sbeitla [“at” Sbeitla? – Chief] on February 17 would have been many heavily armoured weapons. In that battle, the weapon that delayed the enemy longest was not our thinly clad M-3 half track, but rather the more thickly skinned M-3 and M-4 tanks.                  Tank destroyers are not supposed to slug it out, I was told: Therefore, half-inch armor is sufficient protection because they will not get into situations where the weight of metal is important. Tank destroyers will give proper maintenance to their equipment: Therefore, we can afford to have delicate mechanisms.                  But, in Tunisia we did slug it out – even as close as 50 yards. In Sicily they slugged it out on the beach. And in Italy and France and Germany they will slug it out. Certainly an M-10 will not save its crew from all shots fired at it but it will give them better than an even chance to do their job and come back the next day to fight again.                  The half track we used in Africa had, I believe, a more or less conventional commercial motor in it. We had frequent quiet periods in which to do a reasonable amount of maintenance on our vehicles. But we had motor failures and we had transmission failures at the worst time. If anything can go wrong with a vehicle, somehow it manages to happen in battle. Our battalion lost men and equipment at such times. The vagaries of battle are difficult enough to deal with without having to nurse a vehicle through them. If a vehicle is a delicate mechanism, its place is not in a tank battle. If the M-10 is any less delicate than a T-70, then that is the vehicle that can carry us less falteringly to a more bloodless victory.                  Tank destroyers must be just that – to be that, they must be stronger than tanks so that they may have the unquestionable opportunity to destroy them. What good is it if a tank destroyer weapon arrives on the scene of battle if it is only to be destroyed itself? We do not willingly ask men to sacrifice themselves uselessly, but that is what a T-70 compared with other weapons available means for many of our men.                  Our airplanes cost more than any similar planes of our enemies. And they weight more – and they may be slower. But let me remind you of the comparative losses of enemy planes against our own. Our pilots get back to fight again because they have armor sufficient to protect themselves against many of the missiles shot at them. Are our tank destroyer men no less valuable? Do they not deserve allwe can put into a vehicle to help them fight again – to help them protect their lives – to help them knock out four tanks for every tank destroyer lost?                                                                                  Respectfully submitted,                                                                                 Lawrence Marcus, 1st LT, FA