Operation Market-Garden
Дата: 23.09.2011 21:00:35
admin: Montgomery planned to conduct a
limited airborne operation Comet, supposed to be launched
on September 2nd, 1944. Comet envisioned using the 1st Airborne
Division, along with the Polish 1st Independent Parachute
Brigade, to secure several bridges over the River
Rhine to aid the Allied advance into the North German
Plain. The Divisional Headquarters for the 1st Airborne Division,
with the 1st Airlanding Brigade and the Polish 1st
Independent Parachute Brigade were to land
at Nijmegen, 1st Parachute Brigade was to land
at Arnhem, and 4th Parachute Brigade was to land
at Grave. However, several days of poor weather and
Montgomery's concerns over increasing levels of German resistance
caused him to postpone the operation and then cancel it on
September 10.
But Operation Market Garden was created to replace. On September 10th, Dempsey told Montgomery that he had doubts about the plan and favored an advance north-eastwards between the Reichswald forest and the Ruhr to Wesel. Montgomery said that he had just received a signal from London that he should neutralize the V-2 launch sites around the Hague (which were bombarding London) and that the plan must therefore proceed. Montgomery flew to Brussels to meet Eisenhower and requested Eisenhower's Chief Administrative Officer to leave the meeting but insisted on his own remaining. He tore a file of Eisenhower's messages to shreds in front of him and argued for a concentrated northern thrust, simultaneously demanding priority of supply.
Once this region is under control, the northern German plains could be vulnerable for Allied mobile units to drive right through into the heart of Germany. British First Airborne Division, Polish First Parachute Brigade, American 82nd Airborne Division, and the American 101st Airborne Division were to be dropped into designated areas along a line marked by Eindhoven in the south and Arnhem in the north, Netherlands. The airborne troops had the task to make a daylight jump, surprise the enemy and take control of key bridges for the British tanks to cross. Eisenhower halted Patton's advance so that fuel could be made available for ground offensive consisted of British forces. Troops and supplies were also reassigned from a potential assault on the important port city of Antwerp to Operation Market Garden. Antwerp was the most significant Belgian port which the Allies could use. The possible cost of a failed Operation Market Garden was high and the political pressure from the United States to use the elite paratroopers and Montgomery wanted to change strategy from broad-front to narrow-front.
The Market portion of the operation was made up of the airborne attacks. The Allies were able to surprise. No Luftwaffe fighters were alarmed as the C-47 transport aircraft delivered the cargoes; anti-aircraft fire shook the planes, but generally it was not effective. The 101st Airborne Division's reported that this was the most successful challenge in their history to date, even in regards of training missions. After the airborne troops landed, additional equipment was dropped by parachutes onto the ground. American paratroopers of the 101st Airborne Division captured the bridge at Veghel with small resistance, although German artillery attack delayed the Allied advance long enough that the bridge at Son was blown up. Engineers gathered with the paratroopers improvised by placing barn doors across the remains of the bridge to allow light foot traffic of the 101st Airborne Division through. In the north, the 82nd Airborne Division took the bridge at Grave, but they met resistance at Nijmegen; that bridge was eventually abandoned. The British First Airborne Division had the task to capture the bridge at Arnhem and met resistance from units of a German training battalion. Nijmegen and Arnhem's bridges were crossing wide portions of water, so both bridges were to be captured for British tanks to drive through.
The Garden portion of the operation consisted of the row of British tanks heading north along highway 69 (dubbed "Hell's Highway" by American paratroopers), under the command of General Brian Horrocks. The road was about a meter above the ground. That means anything moving along it were prime targets.
On the German side, while their troops were caught by surprise to start, armored divisions quickly gathered to strike back at the Allied paratroopers who were known not to be equipped with anti-tank weapons. The Germans had some luck going with them as in the last days of Field Marshal Walther Model in command of the region, he had ordered 9,000 elite heavy troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps to rest and regroup at Arnhem, which played a major role later as Operation Market Garden carried on.
Von Rundstedt and Model deemed that a big Allied offensive would be imminent, having received many intelligence reports that described a 'constant stream' of reinforcements to the right wing of the British Second Army. The senior intelligence officer of Army Group B assumed that the Second Army would launch an offensive in the direction of Nijmegen, Arnhem and Wesel with a primary objective of reaching the industrial area along the Ruhr River. He was convinced that airborne troops should be used in this offensive. Second Army was to assemble its units at the Maas-Scheldt and Albert Canals. The right wing of the Army was considered to be the assault force, composed primarily of armored units, which was to force a crossing of the Maas and attempt to break through to the Ruhr industrial area near Roermond. The left wing was supposed to cover the Army's northern flank by moving up to the Waal near Nijmegen and isolating the German 15th Army situated on the Dutch coast.
Day 1. Sunday, September 17, 1944
Operation Market-Garden started with successes at all fronts. Almost all troops arrived on top of their target drop zones without problems.
In the south the 101st met some resistance and easily captured the small bridge at Veghel. However, the similar bridge at Son was blown up as they approached it, after being delayed by a short engagement with German AT guns. Later that day several attacks by units of the 15th Army were beaten off, while small units of the 101st had moved south of Son.

A group of German prisoners at Wolfheze, Gelderland, the Netherlands, 17 Sep 1944

A Sherman Firefly tank of the UK Irish Guards Group advancing past Sherman tanks knocked out in previous actions, the Netherlands, 17 Sep 1944

American C-47 aircraft flying over Gheel in Belgium on their way to the Netherlands for Operation Market Garden, 17 Sep 1944

An aerial view of the bridge across the Waal River at Nijmegen, the Netherlands, circa 17-20 Sep 1944
To their north, the 82nd arrived, and the small group, dropped near Grave, took the bridge intact. However, the main force of the 82nd found their task of securing the Groesbeek Heights to the east of Nijmegen much harder than they expected, and they continued to try for the rest of the day. One force tasked with taking the bridge made their attempt, but due to miscommunication they did not start until late in the day and never made it. This left the Nijmegen bridge in German hands.
Meanwhile, the 1st Airborne landed successfully with the exception that the reconnaissance squadron lost over half its jeeps on landing, and the rest were ambushed on their way into Arnhem. Thus the only hope of capturing the bridge was on foot.
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British troops of the 1st Airborne Division aboard C-47 transport aircraft for Operation Market Garden, 17 Sep 1944

C-47 Dakota aircraft dropping troops of UK 1st Airborne Division over Oosterbeek near Arnhem, the Netherlands, 17 Sep 1944
But that turned out to be difficult. Two of the three battalions found themselves slowed down by small German units of a training battalion rushing to hem them in. Luckily, one of the three, led by Lieutenant Colonel John Frost, found their route largely undefended, and arrived at the bridge in the afternoon, setting up defensive positions. Continued attempts by the other two battalions were meeting increased resistance, so the decision was to wait for the second lift and try again the next day.
This was of vital importance. Unlike some of the bridges to the south, which were over smaller rivers and canals and could be bridged by engineering units, the Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges crossed two arms of the Rhine, and there was no possibility of easily bridging either. To make matters worse, the British airborne were on the far side of their bridge. If Nijmegen or Arnhem bridges were not captured and held, there was absolutely no way for XXX Corps to reach them. But at the end of Day 1, only a small force held Arnhem, and Nijmegen was still in German hands.

C-47 Dakota aircraft taking off, towing a CG-4A glider, Britain, 17 Sep 1944

Four men of the 1st Paratroop Battalion, British 1st Airborne Division, took cover in a shell hole outside Arnhem, Netherlands, 17-25 Sep 1944
The British radios malfunctioned. It has been alleged that their long-range VHF sets were delivered with the wrong crystals, and operating on a frequency no one was listening to. The shorter-range sets for use between the brigades did not work either, and battalions were completely cut off from each other. Modern tests using the same type of radios as they had at the time suggest that large deposits of iron in the soil could have been to blame.
XXX Corps didn't start their advance until 2 p.m., due to the fact that General Horrocks was involved in several previous Airborne-related operations that had been aborted at the last minute and refused to risk his troops until he received confirmation that the airborne forces had landed. Soon after the start they ran into a force of infantry and AT units dug in on the road, and it took several hours for them to be cleared, along with the loss of a number of the elite Guards Armoured division's leading tanks. It slowed the advance along the narrow road. By the time the light started giving out at 5 p.m. they were still 15 km south of Eindhoven and camped in Valkenswaard. The operation was already missing the schedule.

An American C-47 aircraft, hit by flak returning from the Market-Garden drop, burning after crash-landing into a knocked-out German Jagdpanther near Gheel, Belgium, 17 Sep 1944
Day 2. Monday, the 18th
Early in the day the 9th Panzer, sent south the day before, concluded they were not needed in Nijmegen, and attempted to return to Arnhem. They knew about the British troops at the bridge, but attempted to cross by force anyway and were beaten back with staggering losses. Newly arrived forces of the 10th SS stopped attempt to move the other two British battalions to the bridge.

Brigadier P. H. W. Hicks studying a map at Divisional Headquarters during the advance to Arnhem, Netherlands during Operation Market Garden, 18 Sep 1944

Two British airborne troops dug in at their brigade headquarters near Arnhem, Gelderland, the Netherlands, 18 Sep 1944
To their south the 82nd was having troubles of its own. Grave was well protected, but Germans continued to press on the 82nd deployed to the east of Nijmegen on the heights. In the morning the Germans took one of the Allied landing areas, target for the second lift which was to arrive at 1:00 p.m. Troops from the entire area, even as far as the town itself, rushed to the drop zone and by 3:00 p.m. it was back in their control. Because of the delay in England the second lift did not arrive until 3:30 p.m.
The 101st attempted to take the similar bridge a few kilometers away at Best. They found their approach heavily blocked and gave up. Other units continued moving to the south and reached the northern end of Eindhoven. At about noon they met recce units from XXX Corps. At 4:00 p.m., they made radio contact with the main force to the south and informed about the Son bridge, asking for a Bailey bridge to be brought forward.
XXX Corps soon arrived in Eindhoven, and by that night were camped out south of Son while they waited for the Royal Engineers to erect the new bridge. The second day ended with the operation already 36 hours behind schedule and both primary bridges still in German hands.

Paratroopers of 1st Allied Airborne Army over the skies of the Netherlands, Sep 1944
Day 3. Tuesday, the 19th
At that time most of the 1st Airborne was in place, and only the Polish brigade was yet to arrive in the 3rd lift later that day. Another attempt was made to reinforce Frost at the bridge, and this time resistance was even stronger. It turned out that there was no longer any hope of reaching the bridge, and the isolated units retreated to Oosterbeek, to the west of Arnhem. At the bridge German tanks were arriving to take up the fight.
At 5 p.m., a small part of the Polish units finally arrived, but fell directly into Germans camped out around the area; with no radios working they had no way to tell the HQ that the landing zone was taken and many of the Polish troops were killed. At the same time several of the supply drop points were also in German hands.

A heavily loaded Universal carrier during the advance of the British 3rd Division, the Netherlands, 19 Sep 1944
Things were going a bit better for the 82nd, who found advanced units of XXX Corps. They were lucky to quickly beat off the Germans in the area, and decided to make a combined effort to take the bridge; the Guards Armoured and 505th (part of the 82nd) were to attack from the south while the 504th had to cross the river in boats and take the north. The boats were called for to make the attempt in the late afternoon, but due to huge traffic problems to the south, they never arrived. Once again XXX Corps was held up in front of a bridge.

Men of 158 Brigade, UK 53rd (Welsh) Division escorting German prisoners, the Netherlands, 19 Sep 1944; note Universal Carrier leading the column

The people of Eindhoven, the Netherlands lined the streets of the town to watch armored vehicles of British XXX Corps passing through, 19 Sep 1944
To their south the units of the 101st sent to take Best the day before found themselves facing a renewed attack that morning and gave ground. When more British tanks arrived, the Germans were beaten off. Later a small force of Panthers arrived at Son and started firing on the Bailey bridge. They were beaten back by AT guns that had recently landed, and the bridge was secured.
Day 4. Wednesday, the 20th
Frost's force at the bridge continued to hold out. Around noon the radios started working and they found out that the rest of the division had no hopes of relieving them, and XXX Corps was stuck to their south in front of Nijmegen bridge. By the afternoon the Germans had complete control of the Arnhem bridge and started setting fire to the houses the British were defending. The rest of the division had set up defensive positions in Oosterbeek to the west of Arnhem, waiting for the arrival of XXX Corps.
In Nijmegen the boats didn't arrive until the afternoon, but time was so short that they decided to do the crossing in daylight. In what is generally considered to be one of the bravest actions in military history, as they made the crossing in 26 rowing boats into well-defended positions. They took the banks and pressed to the bridge, which caused the Germans to pull back from their positions on the southern side. That freed the Guards Armoured, who rushed across the bridge and met the airborne troops. Nijmegen bridge belonged now to Allies.

A convoy of British trucks under German artillery and mortar fire on the road between Son and Eindhoven, the Netherlands, 20 Sep 1944

British Sherman tanks of XXX Corps crossing the bridge at Nijmegen, the Netherlands, 20 Sep 1944
Meanwhile the Germans organized another attack on the heights on the east side of town. The only remaining bridge suitable for tanks fell to the Germans, but was retaken by forces of the 82nd and Coldstream Guards.
To the south the running battles between the 101st and various German units continued, with few Panthers rushing in and cutting off the roads, only leaving when they ran low on ammunition.

British troops of C Company, 5th Battalion, Border Regiment waiting in ditches near a road, observing German troops 100 yards away, Arnhem, Gelderland, the Netherlands, 20 Sep 1944

M10 Wolverine tank destroyers of 77th Anti-Tank Regiment, British 11th Armored Division crossing a Bailey bridge over the Meuse-Escaut (Maas-Schelde) Canal at Lille St Hubert, Belgium, 20 Sep 1944

Vickers machine guns of 2nd Middlesex Regiment, British 3rd Division firing in support of troops crossing the Meuse-Escaut (Maas-Schelde) Canal at Lille-St. Hubert, Belgium, 20 Sep 1944
Day 5. Thursday the 21st
XXX Corps was across the Nijmegen bridge and less than an hour's drive from the battle at the foot on Arnhem bridge. But it was too late for them to succeed. Frost's force was down to two houses, a handful of men, with lack of ammo. With a last radio message "out of ammo, God save the King", heard only by German radio intercept operators, his remaining force surrendered. In memory of the defense at the bridge by Frost, the bridge has been renamed to the "John Frost bridge".

17-pdr anti-tank gun of the 21st Anti-Tank Regiment, British Guards Armoured Division, guarding the approaches to Nijmegen Bridge, the Netherlands, 21 Sep 1944

British engineers removing German demolition charges from the bridge at Nijmegen, the Netherlands, 21 Sep 1944

The vital bridge at Arnhem, the Netherlands after the British paratroops had been driven back, 17-25 Sep 1944
Meanwhile, the rest of the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade arrived. The situation north of the river was obviously too hostile to land, and a new drop zone on the south side across from the 1st was selected. The landings went well, but the ferry they planned to use to reach the British had been sunk.
The commander of Guards Armoured refused to move forward while Nijmegen to their south was still under constant threat, and radioed back along to the line for the 43rd Infantry Division to move up to take over the town. A unit of British field artillery was close enough by this point that they were in radio contact with the units in Oosterbeek, and starting shelling any German units who attempted to approach them.
German attacks continued all along the route, but by this point the Allied forces had started to gain the upper hand.
Day 6. Friday, the 22nd: Black Friday
The Poles were forced to sit and watch the battle from the sidelines not having the proper means to cross the river, with British artillery flying overhead from Nijmegen. Then two British airborne soldiers swam the Rhine and informed them of the desperate situation, asking for help. The Poles were hastily equipped with flimsy inflatable rubber rafts, but promised to try a crossing that night. This operation was opposed, and only 52 soldiers of the 8th Polish Parachute Company succeeded in it.
At that time much of the battle area belonged to Allies. As soon as the 43rd arrived things could be better, and the Guards Armoured could attempt to retake the Arnhem bridge.

Troops of US 101st Airborne Division with members of Dutch resistance at the Eindhoven cathedral, the Netherlands, Sep 1944
But the Germans had other ideas, and during the previous night they had organized two mixed armored formations on either side of highway 69. They attacked and only one side was stopped, while the other made it to the highway and cut the line. Any success on Arnhem was now impossible.
Day 7. Saturday, the 23rd
The Germans had figured out what the Poles were trying to implement, and spent the rest of the day trying to cut the British off from the riverside. The British managed to hold on, and both sides suffered heavy losses. Boats and engineers from the Canadian army arrived that day, and another river crossing that night landed another 150 troops of the Polish 3rd Parachute Battalion.
To the south few more German attacks from the road crossing were stopped, but the road was still cut. XXX Corps then sent a unit of the Guards Armoured south the 20 km and re-took the road. The rest of the force to the north continued to wait for infantry to move up.

British Royal Engineers 1st Para Squadron Cpl John Humphreys, Cpl Charles Weir, Lt Dennis Simpson, Cpt Eric Mackay at Nijmegen, Holland, recreating their escape from German captivity, 23 Sep 1944

C-47 Skytrain aircraft of US 315th Troop Carrier Group dropping 41 sticks of 1st Polish Airborne Brigade into Graves, the Netherlands, 23 Sep 1944; note CG-4A gliders already on the ground
Day 8. Sunday, the 24th
Another German force attacked the road to the south of Veghel. Several units were in the area, but were unable to stop them, and the Germans set up defensive positions for the night. It was not clear to the Allies what actions to expect. But it was on this day that the operation was essentially stopped and the decision made to go over to the defense. The 1st Airborne was to be withdrawn that night. The lines were supposed to be solidified where they were, with the new front line in Nijmegen.
Day 9. Monday, the 25th
At 10 p.m., the withdrawal of the remains of the 1st began, when British and Canadian engineer units ferried the troops across the Rhine, covered by the Polish 3rd Parachute Battalion on the north bank. In a day they had withdrawn some 2,000 of them, but another 300 were still on the north at first light when German fire stopped the effort. And they surrendered. Only 2,000 of the 10,000 troops of the 1st Airborne Division escaped.
To the south, the newly arrived 50th Infantry attacked the Germans holding the highway. By the next day they had been surrounded and the resistance ended. The corridor was secure, but with nowhere to go.
Aftermath
In addition to losses of Allied and German forces, several Dutch were also killed, including few soldiers and officers in British service as well as resistance fighters and civilians. A green area near the bridge, Jacob Groenewoud plantsoen, was named after one Dutch officer.
It is easy to second-guess a battle, and Operation Market Garden is one of the most debated 'what ifs' of the WWII. The two perspectives tend to emerge in the historiography: UK historians prefer to overlook the US Army's contribution, while US historians strive to excoriate Montgomery's generalship. But Eisenhower always believed that Market Garden was a campaign that was worth waging.
One certain problem with the plan of the operation was that it required both bridges over the Rhine to be captured and held. Even with Nijmegen successfully taken, things would be little better if Arnhem bridge fell. This required a forced crossing of the Rhine to relieve the airborne, and there was no planning to allow for this eventuality.
Given this, it is surprising in retrospect that the plans put so little emphasis on capturing the important bridges immediately with forces dropped right on them. In the case of Veghel and Grave, where it was done, the bridges were captured with only a few shots being fired. There seems little reason to suspect the same would not have been true of Arnhem and Nijmegen, but with the troops over an hour's march away there was little hope of their success.
Although Frost's force was likely doomed, Arnhem was not the only available crossing. Eventually, the Market Garden planners realized that a ferry was available at Driel, Frost's paratroops might have secured that instead of the Arnhem bridge, making a significant change in the campaign. If XXX Corps had pushed north, they would have arrived at the south end and secured it, leaving the way open for another crossing to the north.
The commander of XXX Corps wanted another course of action. About 25 km to the west of the action there was another bridge similar to Arnhem, at Rhenen, which he predicted was undefended due to all efforts being directed on Oosterbeek. In fact, that was true, but the Corps were never authorised to take the bridge; if they had, it is almost certain they would have crossed unopposed, into the rear of the German lines. Now it appears that Montgomery was more concerned with the ongoing German assaults on Market Garden's 'tail'.
The Allies were further delayed in their way to Berlin; Germany's European reserves were significantly wiped out; and the Dutch civilians found themselves under German rule again. The destruction, the forced evacuation of Arnhem and the bitter winter of 1944 ensured that the people of the Netherlands suffered most.
But few bad ideas were made throughout the operation, too, with some good opportunities ignored. The commander of the Glider Pilot Regiment had asked for a small force with gliders to land on the southern side of the bridge at Arnhem and to capture it, but he was denied. In England, the commander of the 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division, whose troops were slated to fly into a captured airfield, pleaded with his superiors to allow a force to fly in with gliders to assist Gen. Urquhart's trapped forces; this was also denied. Polish commander, Gen. Stanisław Sosabowski proposed to be dropped dangerously through the fog which held up his drop, but again was refused.
Perhaps the most important thing is that the Dutch resistance was ignored by the forces at Arnhem. There was an essential reason for it, in that Britain's spy network in the Netherlands had been thoroughly and famously compromised. The so-called England game, which had only been discovered in April 1944. Assuming that the Dutch resistance could be similarly penetrated, British intelligence took pains to minimise all civilian contact. As it turned out, the simple knowledge of the Driel ferry, or of the Underground's secret telephone network could have changed the outcome of the operation.

US Army Brigadier General Anthony C. McAuliffe speaking to his glider pilots, England, United Kingdom, Sep 1944; note C-47 Skytrain aircraft in background
But Operation Market Garden was created to replace. On September 10th, Dempsey told Montgomery that he had doubts about the plan and favored an advance north-eastwards between the Reichswald forest and the Ruhr to Wesel. Montgomery said that he had just received a signal from London that he should neutralize the V-2 launch sites around the Hague (which were bombarding London) and that the plan must therefore proceed. Montgomery flew to Brussels to meet Eisenhower and requested Eisenhower's Chief Administrative Officer to leave the meeting but insisted on his own remaining. He tore a file of Eisenhower's messages to shreds in front of him and argued for a concentrated northern thrust, simultaneously demanding priority of supply.
Once this region is under control, the northern German plains could be vulnerable for Allied mobile units to drive right through into the heart of Germany. British First Airborne Division, Polish First Parachute Brigade, American 82nd Airborne Division, and the American 101st Airborne Division were to be dropped into designated areas along a line marked by Eindhoven in the south and Arnhem in the north, Netherlands. The airborne troops had the task to make a daylight jump, surprise the enemy and take control of key bridges for the British tanks to cross. Eisenhower halted Patton's advance so that fuel could be made available for ground offensive consisted of British forces. Troops and supplies were also reassigned from a potential assault on the important port city of Antwerp to Operation Market Garden. Antwerp was the most significant Belgian port which the Allies could use. The possible cost of a failed Operation Market Garden was high and the political pressure from the United States to use the elite paratroopers and Montgomery wanted to change strategy from broad-front to narrow-front.
The Market portion of the operation was made up of the airborne attacks. The Allies were able to surprise. No Luftwaffe fighters were alarmed as the C-47 transport aircraft delivered the cargoes; anti-aircraft fire shook the planes, but generally it was not effective. The 101st Airborne Division's reported that this was the most successful challenge in their history to date, even in regards of training missions. After the airborne troops landed, additional equipment was dropped by parachutes onto the ground. American paratroopers of the 101st Airborne Division captured the bridge at Veghel with small resistance, although German artillery attack delayed the Allied advance long enough that the bridge at Son was blown up. Engineers gathered with the paratroopers improvised by placing barn doors across the remains of the bridge to allow light foot traffic of the 101st Airborne Division through. In the north, the 82nd Airborne Division took the bridge at Grave, but they met resistance at Nijmegen; that bridge was eventually abandoned. The British First Airborne Division had the task to capture the bridge at Arnhem and met resistance from units of a German training battalion. Nijmegen and Arnhem's bridges were crossing wide portions of water, so both bridges were to be captured for British tanks to drive through.
The Garden portion of the operation consisted of the row of British tanks heading north along highway 69 (dubbed "Hell's Highway" by American paratroopers), under the command of General Brian Horrocks. The road was about a meter above the ground. That means anything moving along it were prime targets.
On the German side, while their troops were caught by surprise to start, armored divisions quickly gathered to strike back at the Allied paratroopers who were known not to be equipped with anti-tank weapons. The Germans had some luck going with them as in the last days of Field Marshal Walther Model in command of the region, he had ordered 9,000 elite heavy troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps to rest and regroup at Arnhem, which played a major role later as Operation Market Garden carried on.
Von Rundstedt and Model deemed that a big Allied offensive would be imminent, having received many intelligence reports that described a 'constant stream' of reinforcements to the right wing of the British Second Army. The senior intelligence officer of Army Group B assumed that the Second Army would launch an offensive in the direction of Nijmegen, Arnhem and Wesel with a primary objective of reaching the industrial area along the Ruhr River. He was convinced that airborne troops should be used in this offensive. Second Army was to assemble its units at the Maas-Scheldt and Albert Canals. The right wing of the Army was considered to be the assault force, composed primarily of armored units, which was to force a crossing of the Maas and attempt to break through to the Ruhr industrial area near Roermond. The left wing was supposed to cover the Army's northern flank by moving up to the Waal near Nijmegen and isolating the German 15th Army situated on the Dutch coast.
Day 1. Sunday, September 17, 1944
Operation Market-Garden started with successes at all fronts. Almost all troops arrived on top of their target drop zones without problems.
In the south the 101st met some resistance and easily captured the small bridge at Veghel. However, the similar bridge at Son was blown up as they approached it, after being delayed by a short engagement with German AT guns. Later that day several attacks by units of the 15th Army were beaten off, while small units of the 101st had moved south of Son.

A group of German prisoners at Wolfheze, Gelderland, the Netherlands, 17 Sep 1944

A Sherman Firefly tank of the UK Irish Guards Group advancing past Sherman tanks knocked out in previous actions, the Netherlands, 17 Sep 1944

American C-47 aircraft flying over Gheel in Belgium on their way to the Netherlands for Operation Market Garden, 17 Sep 1944

An aerial view of the bridge across the Waal River at Nijmegen, the Netherlands, circa 17-20 Sep 1944
To their north, the 82nd arrived, and the small group, dropped near Grave, took the bridge intact. However, the main force of the 82nd found their task of securing the Groesbeek Heights to the east of Nijmegen much harder than they expected, and they continued to try for the rest of the day. One force tasked with taking the bridge made their attempt, but due to miscommunication they did not start until late in the day and never made it. This left the Nijmegen bridge in German hands.
Meanwhile, the 1st Airborne landed successfully with the exception that the reconnaissance squadron lost over half its jeeps on landing, and the rest were ambushed on their way into Arnhem. Thus the only hope of capturing the bridge was on foot.
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British troops of the 1st Airborne Division aboard C-47 transport aircraft for Operation Market Garden, 17 Sep 1944

C-47 Dakota aircraft dropping troops of UK 1st Airborne Division over Oosterbeek near Arnhem, the Netherlands, 17 Sep 1944
But that turned out to be difficult. Two of the three battalions found themselves slowed down by small German units of a training battalion rushing to hem them in. Luckily, one of the three, led by Lieutenant Colonel John Frost, found their route largely undefended, and arrived at the bridge in the afternoon, setting up defensive positions. Continued attempts by the other two battalions were meeting increased resistance, so the decision was to wait for the second lift and try again the next day.
This was of vital importance. Unlike some of the bridges to the south, which were over smaller rivers and canals and could be bridged by engineering units, the Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges crossed two arms of the Rhine, and there was no possibility of easily bridging either. To make matters worse, the British airborne were on the far side of their bridge. If Nijmegen or Arnhem bridges were not captured and held, there was absolutely no way for XXX Corps to reach them. But at the end of Day 1, only a small force held Arnhem, and Nijmegen was still in German hands.

C-47 Dakota aircraft taking off, towing a CG-4A glider, Britain, 17 Sep 1944

Four men of the 1st Paratroop Battalion, British 1st Airborne Division, took cover in a shell hole outside Arnhem, Netherlands, 17-25 Sep 1944
The British radios malfunctioned. It has been alleged that their long-range VHF sets were delivered with the wrong crystals, and operating on a frequency no one was listening to. The shorter-range sets for use between the brigades did not work either, and battalions were completely cut off from each other. Modern tests using the same type of radios as they had at the time suggest that large deposits of iron in the soil could have been to blame.
XXX Corps didn't start their advance until 2 p.m., due to the fact that General Horrocks was involved in several previous Airborne-related operations that had been aborted at the last minute and refused to risk his troops until he received confirmation that the airborne forces had landed. Soon after the start they ran into a force of infantry and AT units dug in on the road, and it took several hours for them to be cleared, along with the loss of a number of the elite Guards Armoured division's leading tanks. It slowed the advance along the narrow road. By the time the light started giving out at 5 p.m. they were still 15 km south of Eindhoven and camped in Valkenswaard. The operation was already missing the schedule.

An American C-47 aircraft, hit by flak returning from the Market-Garden drop, burning after crash-landing into a knocked-out German Jagdpanther near Gheel, Belgium, 17 Sep 1944
Day 2. Monday, the 18th
Early in the day the 9th Panzer, sent south the day before, concluded they were not needed in Nijmegen, and attempted to return to Arnhem. They knew about the British troops at the bridge, but attempted to cross by force anyway and were beaten back with staggering losses. Newly arrived forces of the 10th SS stopped attempt to move the other two British battalions to the bridge.

Brigadier P. H. W. Hicks studying a map at Divisional Headquarters during the advance to Arnhem, Netherlands during Operation Market Garden, 18 Sep 1944

Two British airborne troops dug in at their brigade headquarters near Arnhem, Gelderland, the Netherlands, 18 Sep 1944
To their south the 82nd was having troubles of its own. Grave was well protected, but Germans continued to press on the 82nd deployed to the east of Nijmegen on the heights. In the morning the Germans took one of the Allied landing areas, target for the second lift which was to arrive at 1:00 p.m. Troops from the entire area, even as far as the town itself, rushed to the drop zone and by 3:00 p.m. it was back in their control. Because of the delay in England the second lift did not arrive until 3:30 p.m.
The 101st attempted to take the similar bridge a few kilometers away at Best. They found their approach heavily blocked and gave up. Other units continued moving to the south and reached the northern end of Eindhoven. At about noon they met recce units from XXX Corps. At 4:00 p.m., they made radio contact with the main force to the south and informed about the Son bridge, asking for a Bailey bridge to be brought forward.
XXX Corps soon arrived in Eindhoven, and by that night were camped out south of Son while they waited for the Royal Engineers to erect the new bridge. The second day ended with the operation already 36 hours behind schedule and both primary bridges still in German hands.

Paratroopers of 1st Allied Airborne Army over the skies of the Netherlands, Sep 1944
Day 3. Tuesday, the 19th
At that time most of the 1st Airborne was in place, and only the Polish brigade was yet to arrive in the 3rd lift later that day. Another attempt was made to reinforce Frost at the bridge, and this time resistance was even stronger. It turned out that there was no longer any hope of reaching the bridge, and the isolated units retreated to Oosterbeek, to the west of Arnhem. At the bridge German tanks were arriving to take up the fight.
At 5 p.m., a small part of the Polish units finally arrived, but fell directly into Germans camped out around the area; with no radios working they had no way to tell the HQ that the landing zone was taken and many of the Polish troops were killed. At the same time several of the supply drop points were also in German hands.

A heavily loaded Universal carrier during the advance of the British 3rd Division, the Netherlands, 19 Sep 1944
Things were going a bit better for the 82nd, who found advanced units of XXX Corps. They were lucky to quickly beat off the Germans in the area, and decided to make a combined effort to take the bridge; the Guards Armoured and 505th (part of the 82nd) were to attack from the south while the 504th had to cross the river in boats and take the north. The boats were called for to make the attempt in the late afternoon, but due to huge traffic problems to the south, they never arrived. Once again XXX Corps was held up in front of a bridge.

Men of 158 Brigade, UK 53rd (Welsh) Division escorting German prisoners, the Netherlands, 19 Sep 1944; note Universal Carrier leading the column

The people of Eindhoven, the Netherlands lined the streets of the town to watch armored vehicles of British XXX Corps passing through, 19 Sep 1944
To their south the units of the 101st sent to take Best the day before found themselves facing a renewed attack that morning and gave ground. When more British tanks arrived, the Germans were beaten off. Later a small force of Panthers arrived at Son and started firing on the Bailey bridge. They were beaten back by AT guns that had recently landed, and the bridge was secured.
Day 4. Wednesday, the 20th
Frost's force at the bridge continued to hold out. Around noon the radios started working and they found out that the rest of the division had no hopes of relieving them, and XXX Corps was stuck to their south in front of Nijmegen bridge. By the afternoon the Germans had complete control of the Arnhem bridge and started setting fire to the houses the British were defending. The rest of the division had set up defensive positions in Oosterbeek to the west of Arnhem, waiting for the arrival of XXX Corps.
In Nijmegen the boats didn't arrive until the afternoon, but time was so short that they decided to do the crossing in daylight. In what is generally considered to be one of the bravest actions in military history, as they made the crossing in 26 rowing boats into well-defended positions. They took the banks and pressed to the bridge, which caused the Germans to pull back from their positions on the southern side. That freed the Guards Armoured, who rushed across the bridge and met the airborne troops. Nijmegen bridge belonged now to Allies.

A convoy of British trucks under German artillery and mortar fire on the road between Son and Eindhoven, the Netherlands, 20 Sep 1944

British Sherman tanks of XXX Corps crossing the bridge at Nijmegen, the Netherlands, 20 Sep 1944
Meanwhile the Germans organized another attack on the heights on the east side of town. The only remaining bridge suitable for tanks fell to the Germans, but was retaken by forces of the 82nd and Coldstream Guards.
To the south the running battles between the 101st and various German units continued, with few Panthers rushing in and cutting off the roads, only leaving when they ran low on ammunition.

British troops of C Company, 5th Battalion, Border Regiment waiting in ditches near a road, observing German troops 100 yards away, Arnhem, Gelderland, the Netherlands, 20 Sep 1944

M10 Wolverine tank destroyers of 77th Anti-Tank Regiment, British 11th Armored Division crossing a Bailey bridge over the Meuse-Escaut (Maas-Schelde) Canal at Lille St Hubert, Belgium, 20 Sep 1944

Vickers machine guns of 2nd Middlesex Regiment, British 3rd Division firing in support of troops crossing the Meuse-Escaut (Maas-Schelde) Canal at Lille-St. Hubert, Belgium, 20 Sep 1944
Day 5. Thursday the 21st
XXX Corps was across the Nijmegen bridge and less than an hour's drive from the battle at the foot on Arnhem bridge. But it was too late for them to succeed. Frost's force was down to two houses, a handful of men, with lack of ammo. With a last radio message "out of ammo, God save the King", heard only by German radio intercept operators, his remaining force surrendered. In memory of the defense at the bridge by Frost, the bridge has been renamed to the "John Frost bridge".

17-pdr anti-tank gun of the 21st Anti-Tank Regiment, British Guards Armoured Division, guarding the approaches to Nijmegen Bridge, the Netherlands, 21 Sep 1944

British engineers removing German demolition charges from the bridge at Nijmegen, the Netherlands, 21 Sep 1944

The vital bridge at Arnhem, the Netherlands after the British paratroops had been driven back, 17-25 Sep 1944
Meanwhile, the rest of the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade arrived. The situation north of the river was obviously too hostile to land, and a new drop zone on the south side across from the 1st was selected. The landings went well, but the ferry they planned to use to reach the British had been sunk.
The commander of Guards Armoured refused to move forward while Nijmegen to their south was still under constant threat, and radioed back along to the line for the 43rd Infantry Division to move up to take over the town. A unit of British field artillery was close enough by this point that they were in radio contact with the units in Oosterbeek, and starting shelling any German units who attempted to approach them.
German attacks continued all along the route, but by this point the Allied forces had started to gain the upper hand.
Day 6. Friday, the 22nd: Black Friday
The Poles were forced to sit and watch the battle from the sidelines not having the proper means to cross the river, with British artillery flying overhead from Nijmegen. Then two British airborne soldiers swam the Rhine and informed them of the desperate situation, asking for help. The Poles were hastily equipped with flimsy inflatable rubber rafts, but promised to try a crossing that night. This operation was opposed, and only 52 soldiers of the 8th Polish Parachute Company succeeded in it.
At that time much of the battle area belonged to Allies. As soon as the 43rd arrived things could be better, and the Guards Armoured could attempt to retake the Arnhem bridge.

Troops of US 101st Airborne Division with members of Dutch resistance at the Eindhoven cathedral, the Netherlands, Sep 1944
But the Germans had other ideas, and during the previous night they had organized two mixed armored formations on either side of highway 69. They attacked and only one side was stopped, while the other made it to the highway and cut the line. Any success on Arnhem was now impossible.
Day 7. Saturday, the 23rd
The Germans had figured out what the Poles were trying to implement, and spent the rest of the day trying to cut the British off from the riverside. The British managed to hold on, and both sides suffered heavy losses. Boats and engineers from the Canadian army arrived that day, and another river crossing that night landed another 150 troops of the Polish 3rd Parachute Battalion.
To the south few more German attacks from the road crossing were stopped, but the road was still cut. XXX Corps then sent a unit of the Guards Armoured south the 20 km and re-took the road. The rest of the force to the north continued to wait for infantry to move up.

British Royal Engineers 1st Para Squadron Cpl John Humphreys, Cpl Charles Weir, Lt Dennis Simpson, Cpt Eric Mackay at Nijmegen, Holland, recreating their escape from German captivity, 23 Sep 1944

C-47 Skytrain aircraft of US 315th Troop Carrier Group dropping 41 sticks of 1st Polish Airborne Brigade into Graves, the Netherlands, 23 Sep 1944; note CG-4A gliders already on the ground
Day 8. Sunday, the 24th
Another German force attacked the road to the south of Veghel. Several units were in the area, but were unable to stop them, and the Germans set up defensive positions for the night. It was not clear to the Allies what actions to expect. But it was on this day that the operation was essentially stopped and the decision made to go over to the defense. The 1st Airborne was to be withdrawn that night. The lines were supposed to be solidified where they were, with the new front line in Nijmegen.
Day 9. Monday, the 25th
At 10 p.m., the withdrawal of the remains of the 1st began, when British and Canadian engineer units ferried the troops across the Rhine, covered by the Polish 3rd Parachute Battalion on the north bank. In a day they had withdrawn some 2,000 of them, but another 300 were still on the north at first light when German fire stopped the effort. And they surrendered. Only 2,000 of the 10,000 troops of the 1st Airborne Division escaped.
To the south, the newly arrived 50th Infantry attacked the Germans holding the highway. By the next day they had been surrounded and the resistance ended. The corridor was secure, but with nowhere to go.
Aftermath
In addition to losses of Allied and German forces, several Dutch were also killed, including few soldiers and officers in British service as well as resistance fighters and civilians. A green area near the bridge, Jacob Groenewoud plantsoen, was named after one Dutch officer.
It is easy to second-guess a battle, and Operation Market Garden is one of the most debated 'what ifs' of the WWII. The two perspectives tend to emerge in the historiography: UK historians prefer to overlook the US Army's contribution, while US historians strive to excoriate Montgomery's generalship. But Eisenhower always believed that Market Garden was a campaign that was worth waging.
One certain problem with the plan of the operation was that it required both bridges over the Rhine to be captured and held. Even with Nijmegen successfully taken, things would be little better if Arnhem bridge fell. This required a forced crossing of the Rhine to relieve the airborne, and there was no planning to allow for this eventuality.
Given this, it is surprising in retrospect that the plans put so little emphasis on capturing the important bridges immediately with forces dropped right on them. In the case of Veghel and Grave, where it was done, the bridges were captured with only a few shots being fired. There seems little reason to suspect the same would not have been true of Arnhem and Nijmegen, but with the troops over an hour's march away there was little hope of their success.
Although Frost's force was likely doomed, Arnhem was not the only available crossing. Eventually, the Market Garden planners realized that a ferry was available at Driel, Frost's paratroops might have secured that instead of the Arnhem bridge, making a significant change in the campaign. If XXX Corps had pushed north, they would have arrived at the south end and secured it, leaving the way open for another crossing to the north.
The commander of XXX Corps wanted another course of action. About 25 km to the west of the action there was another bridge similar to Arnhem, at Rhenen, which he predicted was undefended due to all efforts being directed on Oosterbeek. In fact, that was true, but the Corps were never authorised to take the bridge; if they had, it is almost certain they would have crossed unopposed, into the rear of the German lines. Now it appears that Montgomery was more concerned with the ongoing German assaults on Market Garden's 'tail'.
The Allies were further delayed in their way to Berlin; Germany's European reserves were significantly wiped out; and the Dutch civilians found themselves under German rule again. The destruction, the forced evacuation of Arnhem and the bitter winter of 1944 ensured that the people of the Netherlands suffered most.
But few bad ideas were made throughout the operation, too, with some good opportunities ignored. The commander of the Glider Pilot Regiment had asked for a small force with gliders to land on the southern side of the bridge at Arnhem and to capture it, but he was denied. In England, the commander of the 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division, whose troops were slated to fly into a captured airfield, pleaded with his superiors to allow a force to fly in with gliders to assist Gen. Urquhart's trapped forces; this was also denied. Polish commander, Gen. Stanisław Sosabowski proposed to be dropped dangerously through the fog which held up his drop, but again was refused.
Perhaps the most important thing is that the Dutch resistance was ignored by the forces at Arnhem. There was an essential reason for it, in that Britain's spy network in the Netherlands had been thoroughly and famously compromised. The so-called England game, which had only been discovered in April 1944. Assuming that the Dutch resistance could be similarly penetrated, British intelligence took pains to minimise all civilian contact. As it turned out, the simple knowledge of the Driel ferry, or of the Underground's secret telephone network could have changed the outcome of the operation.

US Army Brigadier General Anthony C. McAuliffe speaking to his glider pilots, England, United Kingdom, Sep 1944; note C-47 Skytrain aircraft in background
