The Battle of Kursk

admin: While mentioning the Battle of Kursk in front of most people immediately appear well known newsreel with attacking tank spearheads with infantry support and flying at low level IL-2 attack aircrafts. Huge number of scientific and journalistic publications and research works were written. A lot of popular-science and costume drama films about the Battle of Kursk Salient were created. All these materials have firmly ingrained in the public mind the association of the battles near Prokhorovka with the tank battle of July 12. And each research work gives to us the number of armored units and their qualitative characteristics, battle losses of armored vehicles, as well as the number of repaired vehicles (incredible efforts of field repair teams) but each work disregards the fact that in the end it was people who won the battle.

So, the Command of the German armed forces decided to conduct massive offensive operation. However, the spring 1943 faced the German High Command with a very difficult decision. The first question was if the German troops could stabilize the situation on the Eastern front (not in terms of the complete defeat of the Soviet Union). The idea was if there was any possibility of achieving a draw? In the given situation on all fronts this solution meant for Germany the prospect to withstand as a state.
For the successful maintaining of the Operation “Citadel” the Germans concentrated powerful strike forces: over 900 thousands of ground forces, about 10 thousands artillery guns, 2,700 tanks and assault guns and about 2050 aircraft. Germans put high hopes on their latest “Tiger” and “Panther” tanks, SPGs “Elephant/(Ferdinand)”, “Focke-Wolf 190-A” fighters and “Henschel-129” attack aircraft. The Command of the Army Group “Center” led Field Marshal Gunther Hans von Kluge, and the Command of the Army Group “South” was headed by Field-Marshal-General Fritz Erich von Manstein.

The Command of the Soviet forces decided to hold a defensive battle, exhaust the enemy forces and strike him back in a critical moment with decisive counterattack. For this purpose, on both directions of Kursk Salient was created defense in depth. The forces of the Central Front (commander - Gen. Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the north front of the Kursk Salient, and the forces of the Voronezh Front (commander - Gen. Nikolai Vatutin) - southern front. The troops occupying the salient were based on the Stepnoy Front (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The forces of the Central and Voronezh Fronts had more than 1 million 300 thousand soldiers, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, 3,600 tanks and self-propelled guns and about 2950 aircraft. However, in the battle was supposed to be applied (and that happened in reality) the forces of the Stepnoy Front under Gen/ Konev command. We should mention, that along with two Soviet group of forces had about 1.9million soldiers, about 4,900 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 27 thousand artillery barrels.

According to the plan of the operation “Citadel" Army Group "Center" and "South" were assigned to attack and defeat Soviet forces acting on the Kursk Salient. Areas of cities Orel, Kursk and Belgorod became the focus of the German command. Deep overhang of the Soviet front in the line of the German disposition caused great concern among German Command officers. Using this overhang as a bridgehead, Soviet forces could strike at the tactical bound between army groups "Center" and "South" and make deep breakthrough into the central regions of Ukraine to the Dnieper. At the same time Hitler’s strategists could not resist the temptation of applying encounter attacks from the north and south to cut off the Kursk overhang. That would lead to the encirclement and elimination of a large group of Soviet troops on it. Afterwards, the German Command planned to start an offensive operation to the north-eastern or southern direction. Thus, Hitler’s generals intended to take revenge for Stalingrad. This operation considered to be of “high priority” at Hitler’s Supreme High Command General Headquarters. To maintain this operation the troops from other parts of the Eastern Front were transferred (from the Demyansk, Rzhev, from the Taman peninsula and other areas). By these means the combined force grouping on Kursk direction was strengthened with 32 divisions (including three tank and two motorized divisions).

Supreme High Command General Headquarters of Soviet forces decided to adopt the deliberate defense. The Plan of the Red Army actions in the summer of 1943 started to be developed in April 1943, while Stalin made a final decision only in June. The Supreme Command of the Red Army was ready for decisive actions. Front Commanders such as Konstantin Rokossovsky, Nicholas F.Vatutin, Rodion Malinovsky, and some others considered that the continuation of offensive was a pressing need. However, the Supreme Commander did not want to risk and not fully shared the views of his commanders. Stalin was not sure in the success of the offensive as such summer operations of the Red Army had failed earlier. Defeats in the spring and summer of 1942 (the Crimea, under Luban, Demyansk, Bolhovom, Kharkov and Leningrad) was still fresh in his memory to hope for the luck. Stalin's doubts increased when the enemy plans of offensive in the Kursk area opened up.
It’s a well-known fact that on April 12, 1943 Stalin got the detailed text of the Directive No.6 “Plan of “Citadel” operation” by the German High Command, a document signed by all the services of the Wehrmacht (but had not yet been signed by Hitler - he will sign it only after three days). It is also is known that these data were obtained by a spy who worked under the name "Werter."

The defense of Kursk was based primarily as an anti-tank defense. Was based on anti-tank defense centers (ATDC), constructed as a rule in battalion (company) areas of defense, and anti-tank fortified area (ATFA), and created by their own troops or within the regimental areas of defense. Anti-tank defense (ATD) was reinforced by artillery and anti-tank reserve. Fire systems of ATDC and ATFA tied to fire of artillery, located on the open and closed firing positions. An interesting moment was that even cannon and howitzer artillery was prepared to fire at enemy tanks over open sights. Tank crews of the second line and reserves prepared firing lines and tank ambushes. Flamethrower units, tank destroyer units and dog-anti-tank units were used to fight the enemy tanks. In front of the forefront and in its depth over 1 million anti-tank mines were planted and dozens kilometers of anti-tank obstacles: ditches, scarps, counterscarp, tank obstacles, forest abatis, etc. Another important element of anti-tank defense became mobile obstacle units MOU. The depth of ATD near Kursk reached 30-35 km for the first time in World War II. All available fire resources supposed to be used massively and according to the possible directions of enemy attacks.

The Command of the Soviet Army took into account the fact that the enemy usually goes into the offensive with strong air support. Special attention had been drawn to the organization of anti-aircraft defense (AAD). To gain the objectives of AAD available anti-aircraft means were reinforced with anti-aircraft artillery of Fronts, fighters and considerable amount of Anti-Aircraft Forces of the country. More than 60% of combat forces were covered by two or three-layer anti-aircraft fire and fighter aircraft.
A huge help to the troops of the Fronts had been provided by the local population of Orel, Voronezh, Kursk, Sumy and Kharkov regions. To the construction of fortifications hundreds of thousands of people were involved. Thus in April in the area of the Central and Voronezh Fronts for defensive works were attracted more than 100 thousand people and in June nearly 300 thousand of people.

The balance of forces by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk was the following. The command of German forces involved over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, more than 2.7 thousand tanks and SPGs and more than 2 thousand planes to conduct offensive actions of “Citadel” operation. The soviet Army had the forces of the Central and Voronezh Fronts with more than 1.3 million people, 19.1 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3,4 thousand tanks and SPGs, 2.9 thousand aircraft. Consequently, Soviet Armies (excluding the Stepnoy Front) had superiority over the enemy in men by 1.4 times, in the artillery (not including rocket launchers and antiaircraft guns) - 1.9, in tanks and SPGs - in 1.2 and in the aircraft - 1.4-times. Based on the analysis of the current situation Fronts Commanders increasingly questioned the decision of a high command to move to a deliberate defense. General Vatutin tried to convince Wasilevski and later Stalin that this situation of deliberate defense is hardly advisable, since it leads to loss of valuable time, and eventually could lead to the disruption of all his plans of the summer-autumn 1943 campaign plan. He believed that it was necessary to take pre-emptive offensive actions. The Supreme Commander ordered to work out the plan of this possible offensive operation carefully and asked Vatutin, Rokossovsky and Malinowski (Commander of the Southwestern Front) to provide their suggestions to General Headquarters of Supreme Commander. But Zhukov and Vasilevsky, firmly convinced of the need to meet the German offensive at Kursk, defended the previously developed plan.

Thus, in a period of relative peace on the Eastern front, which lasted from late March to early July 1943, the warring parties made a huge effort to fully prepare for the upcoming battles. The Soviet Union and its armed forces were to fully commit to these battles. It was required to make the best use of the weapons and forces available. Given the advantageous arsenal of weapons the enemy had, we can conclude that Hitler's decision to attack, by all means, from a military point of view was a gamble. But the Nazi leaders went for it, giving priority to political considerations. This was stated by the German Fuehrer in his speech in East Prussia on July 1st. According to him, Operation Citadel would have not only military but also of political significance that would help to keep Germany's allies and to thwart the plans of the Western powers to open a second front, as well as having a beneficial effect on the internal situation in Germany. However, the position of German troops was made less effective by the fact that the previous surprise attacks, through which they were largely successful in the summer operations 1941 and 1942, had been lost. Resulting in the constant postponement of Kursk aided by effective work carried out by the Soviet intelligence agency. By early July, all decisions were final, the task forces set, and huge masses of opposing troops on the Kursk Bulge were waiting in the calm before the storm.

The German offensive started at 16:00 pm July 4, reconnaissance missions were carried out in the Kursk salient in order to dislodge the field outposts of the 2nd Guards Army General Chistyakov. In the morning of July 5, 1943 the offensive continued in the southern and the northern areas. The Soviet commanders knew the exact time when the operation was to be started, and at 3 am, 30-40 minutes before the start, artillery and anti-aircraft weapons were readied. Artillery was set up in empty positions as the Germans were still asleep in their dugouts, but the Soviet troops woke them up. Soviet fire strike broke the German communications units and caused great damage to the German artillery, the initial attack was postponed for 6 hours and 30 minutes (the German artillery preparation was scheduled for 6:00 began half an hour later).
Before the start of the ground operations the Germans bombed the Soviet defensive lines and artillery. The offensive tanks faced serious resistance. The main attack on the northern side was in the direction of Olkhovatka. Unable to achieve success, the Germans suffered a blow in Ponyri; they were not able to break through the Soviet defenses. The Wehrmacht was able to move a mere by 10-12 km; on July 10th after losing up to two-thirds of their tanks, the 9th German Army went from being offensive to defensive. On the southern side the German army focused on Koroch and Oboyan.
The first two days in the “Centre” the 9th Army managed to penetrate deep into the enemy's defenses (14 km) in the offensive zone and to the left of the buildings.  Right-flank corps, however, moved slightly, the same neighbor shell, in fact, remained in place.
On the second day the enemy stepped up their counterattacks against the flanks of the shock front and carried out an army wedge. The enemy began to send in operational reserves, which were placed in the northwestern part of the Kursk salient, and to the south-eastern portion of the Oryol arc. It was a sign that the enemy intended to hold Kursk Bulge under all circumstances, and at the same time, if successful, Operation Citadel could make it possible to surround the enemy. Despite these counter-shocks, wedge 9th Army moved forward, although it had the band width of only 10 km. However, the attack was stopped on July 9 on the line of defense in the hilly terrain in Olkhovatka area, 18 km from the initial position of 9th Army. Army commanders assumed that after stopping enemy counterattacks, they should change the main direction of movement and introduce the reserve fight to resume the offensive on July 12th to complete the break. But this did not happen. July 11 enemy forces launched an offensive from the east and north-east against the 2nd Panzer Army, which were by Orel arc. The battles in this area forced the Center commanders to stop 9th Army and make it relocate their forces to fight in area of 2 Panzer Army.

The first break tear in the enemy's defenses occurred on the South front but it came with great difficulty. The biggest difficulties were the lack of infantry divisions required for the first attack, and the relative weakness of artillery support.
Kempf’s Army Group was unable to stop the right-flank corps (11 Corps, Gen. Routh) from advancing to the planned new frontier on Korocha River; they could only reach the area west of the rivers meander. Although the intended target at this extreme right flank of the offensive was not achieved, Kempf could still be happy with the outcome... He crippled the enemy's operational reserves due to the vigorous attacks of his troops, located east of Volchansk. During the following days he made great strides against defensive positions, causing heavy enemy losses, including many tanks. Finally, the group could be satisfied with defense at river Koren, which allowed their own offensive to stay relatively intact.
The 3rd Panzer Corps was engaged in heavy fighting too. The first attack on the both sides of Donets River in Belgorod was carried out under very difficult circumstances. Apparently, the forces stopped in front of the second defensive belt - about 18 km ahead of Donets. Due to losses incurred by the troops, the Army Group commander asked, whether they should stop the offensive. According to the conversation with the commander of 3rd Panzer Corps Gen. Hermann Breith and his divisional commanders, he decided to continue with the offensive. The Commander of Army Group sent an extra 198 infantry divisions, which acted as a reserve in the rear of the tank army at the Donetsk front, despite the fact that a dangerous situation occurred there. July 11th the corps finally broke through the enemy's last line of defense. The way was clear, allowing them to advance into an unprotected area with the appropriate mobile units of enemy reserves, placed to the east of Kharkov.
The Commander ordered the right 3rd tank corps group to move towards the Korocha River, and the left to collate with 4th Panzer Army and to destroy 69th enemy army, which was broken between two armies.
The 4th Panzer Army broke through the first and second lines of defense with intense fighting occurring on the first two days. On July 7 the Tank Corps on the left flank of the army (48 infantry division, General von Knobelsdorff) broke into an area about 11 miles in front of Oboyan. In the following days he had to reflect strong counterattacks carried out on the north-east, north and west. He defeated significant forces of attacking enemy troops in these battles. On this site and the area in front of two SS tank corps, the operational reserve came into action, namely three tank and one mechanized corps, which joined the 69th and 1st tank armies. Other mechanized corps the enemy brought in from the area east of Kharkov.

By July 11th the Germans had taken their positions to attack Prokhorovka. By this time the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army was concentrated on the position to the north-east of the station. That Army was in reserve; on July 6 they were ordered to perform a 300-kilometer march and to take up defensive positions at the turn of Prokhorovka - Vesyoliy. The 5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Guards Army and 1st Panzer, 6th and 7th Guards Armies were the main forces in the counter-attack. But in reality, only the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards were used, and two independent tank corps (the 2nd and the 2nd Guards) could join the attack. The rest carried out defensive battles against the attacking German troops. Motorized Division Leibstandarte, SS Panzer Division Das Reich and the SS Panzer Division Totenkopf fought against Soviet offensive troops.
It should also be noted that by that time the German offensive on the northern side of Kursk Bulge was already weakened, from July 10 the German attackers began to set up their defensive.
Traditionally, Soviet sources indicated that the battle involved approximately 1,500 tanks: 800 Soviets and 700 German. In some cases, however a lower figure of  1200 is quoted, as well as a narrower area  (8-10 km wide), which was surrounded by the Psel River on one side and the railway embankment on the other, making it impossible to maneuver large vehicles.
July 12 at 8:30 am German forces launched an offensive against the Prokhorovka station. At the same time after a 15-minute artillery barrage, they were attacked by the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army, commanded by Gen. Rotmistrov.

Memoirs of Pavel Rotmistrov, the marshal of the armored forces:
“In the morning of July 12th I was at an observation point alongside a group of officers. We were able to observe the field of the upcoming battle properly. By 6 a.m. it was reported that the troops are ready for the fight. And during the very first minutes of the battle two huge “billows” of tanks started to move towards each other covered in dust and smoke. Not large area near Prokhorovka was occupied by nearly 1,500 tanks at the same time. That was the beginning of the most severe tank battle in the whole of war history. The field near Prokhorovka appeared to be too narrow for such a big amount of battle participants. The fight was going on until very late night. The tanks were unable to part; they remained a huge steel ball. The battlefield was literally on fire. Hundreds of tanks, self-propelled guns were burning. The noise was horrible… skirring of tracks, shells explosions and pinging before striking the target.
Hitler’s command was hoping for “a battle surprise” to be presented to the Soviet Army – the heavy Tigers, Panthers and SPGs Ferdinand. However the Soviet warriors used the maneuverability of their vehicles and were going for the jugular of the German beasts. The shells sent from short distances were tearing through the armor of the Tigers. The ammunition inside the tanks were exploding, the turrets were coming off, followed by heavy black smoke.
This battle showed how brave and self-sacrificing junior officers and soldiers were. I can give you one example. The tank platoon under the command of lieutenant Bondarenko was ordered to help the second tank division that appeared to be in a difficult situation. They moved ahead fast. Against two moving and shooting Tigers. Using the mobility of the tank Bondarenko put his tank behind one of the German burning tanks. The Germans were sure that the Soviet tank was on fire. Meanwhile the commander aimed at one of the Tigers and set it on fire.
The air battle was also fierce. Soviet and German planes were struggling above the tanks. Nothing could be heard apart from terrible howling everywhere. Burning aircrafts diving into the sea of tanks in their final nosedive… Everything seemed to be a single mass ceaselessly moving and rumbling.

The severe tank battle in which both sides sustained terrible losses lasted one long summer day. It ended in total defeat of the German main attack force.”
One of the participants of this battle, the Hero of the Soviet Union Evgheniy Shkurdalov recollected later:
“The combat arrangements were mixed up. As a result of direct kills tanks were exploding. The turrets were blown off, tracks were coming off too. There was horrible rumbling. It was impossible to hear separate shots. There were moments when we couldn’t see the tanks properly and had to guess whether they were ours or German according to their silhouettes.  Tankers were jumping off the burning vehicles and rolling around trying to knock down the fire.
Finally the German tanks were more like scrap metal and hardly reminded combat vehicles.
However the victory was won at high price. At one part of the front the Germans delivered a severe thrust. 300 German tanks battled through. The Soviet artillery was unable to stop them and the only way out found was struggling against steel beasts nearly barehanded. Soldiers were crawling along the field with grenades and were appearing in front of tanks when there were only a few meters in between them. They were exploding vehicles often alongside themselves. This duel between a steel beast and people was won by the latter. “
Pavel Rotmistrov also wrote:
“During one day of the battle near Prokhorovka 5th Guard Tank Army destroyed nearly 400 tanks of the rivals, including 70 Tigers, 158 guns and mine throwers, over 300 auto machines, more than 500 soldiers and officers. The main attacking force was completely destroyed.
SS tank corps commander Obergruppenführer Hausser was immediately spared from his position as he was accused of the failure. During the battle over 700 tanks in total were destroyed. The battlefield was covered with dead bodies. The ground was burnt and black along 10-12 km.”
Thus the main support of the German tank forces was crushed near Prokhorovka.

However there are historians who doubt such an ending of the battle near Prokhorovka.  Some of them believe that Germans won, others insist that there wasn’t a winner in that battle and neither the Soviet Union, nor Germany got advantages after it. There are also doubts on how many tanks did take part in the battle near Prokhorovka. Another question concerns the issue of whether the battle had been planned in advance or the forces encountered each other accidentally as the place for such a battle was definitely uncomfortable. And there’s only one thing that doesn’t leave any doubts – the battle near Prokhorovka has been the greatest tank battle in war history and had huge importance for the whole of Kursk operation and WWII in general.
The German Army couldn’t recover after the battle. Its best commanders and crews were buried on that battlefield forever. It was the last such a global operation undertaken by the Germans.
Tank corps commander Paul Hausser was removed from the post and called off the front.
During Kursk operation the troops of Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts defeated the plan of the Nazi command to surround and defeat a millionth Soviet troops forces. It was a try to take revenge after Stalingrad and it failed.
The victory near Prokhorovka created favorable conditions for counter attacking.

The success gained was due to the defense built on Kursk Salient was the strongest during the whole war. It was supposed to reflect massive assaults of the rivals. It was deep and the positions were counted accurately taking into consideration force density and means available.
Apart from that the German aviation didn’t manage to conquer the sky in this battle. The Soviet airmen crushed over 1,500 German planes while their own losses amounted to 460 planes.
They paid a really high price for this victory. People losses were nearly 180,000. Also they lost 1,600 tanks and SPGs, nearly 4,000 guns and mine throwers.
The German side was forced to pass over to the defensive.