From the Mouths of Babes

The_Chieftain:  Although it is not specified in either this letter or this cover sheet, it seems likely that Major Wood, representative of the TD Board, had inquired of the good lieutenant his opinion of the upcoming 76mm Gun Motor Carriage, T70. (Of course, what would turn into the M18 Hellcat). At this point, I shall diverge briefly to a note from a Colonel Jacoby at Anzio on 12 May 44. The question he was asked, amongst others, by TD Board was: “Are any battalions equipped with the T70? If so, how is it liked?”  The response was:  No battalions are equipped with T70s, but the 805th will be equipped as soon as sufficient T70s arrive in the theater. The T70 is thoroughly disliked for the following reasons:                  a.            Its armor is entirely too thin and it is not the superb seventy-thousand-dollar foxhole which the M10 is.                  b.            It uses a gas engine, which is a tremendous fire hazard when hit. This does not exist to such a degree with the Diesel powered M10. [Another Chieftain’s observation: I frequently find that in period documentation, the term ‘diesel’ is capitalised. This is, of course, completely correct as it’s the man’s name, I just find it interesting that it has evolved over time to an uncapitalised state. I do note, however, that the use of the apostrophe preceeding “phone” or “plane” seems to have already become rare by WW2.]                  c.             It looks very much like the German Mark V. Anyway, I have digressed again. Lt Marcus’ letter made it to the top of the Tank Destroyer Board. Col Hanzen L. Hoyt, Tactical Section, remarked “Lieutenant Marcus speaks of the vulnerability of the half-track with ¼” vertical armor. It would seem unfair to compare this vehicle to the T70 with greater mobility and heavier sloping armor. I see no reason at this time to consider our doctrines unsound.” A note added to the discussion by an individual initialed “RTJ”, whose identity I have not yet determined, was perhaps a little more realistic. Col R. C Montgomery: 1.            When “slugging it out” with tanks is considered, then armor is absolutely necessary. Lt Marcus is concurred in on this score. 2.            TD doctrine prescribes that tanks will not be charged or pursued in the open by destroyers. However, it does prescribe that when tanks advance, tank destroyers hold their ground, since destruction by fire can be accomplished best at close range. Of course, with this goes the necessity of “digging in” if possible. Holding and destroying at close range is “slugging” in most cases. 3.            Soundness of doctrine is very often interpreted by the individual according to his understanding of particular parts of that doctrine. Certainly Lt Marcus and those who have had need for more armor in combat cannot be contradicted as to that need – and their injuries are less than those of the ones who cannot return. I believe TD doctrine is sound as expressed in WD Training Publications, and in revised FM 18-5; but when it is examined carefully on the battlefield doctrine alone does not stop armor piercing small arms (cal .50) fire. This brings us back to a topic we’ve mentioned before: The difference between a piece of equipment to win a war, and a piece of equipment to win a battle. And with respect to the M18/M10, the last few extracts further enhance the difference of opinion as to what’s important, with user opinions varying rather depending on what they were doing. Units which objected to turning in the M10 for M18 may have had opinions contrary to the Tank Destroyer Board, but it wasn’t just out of familiarity. Even the M10 was plenty fast enough for the tactical job. A hand-written note under RTJ’s commentary, initialed at the bottom by possibly RCM, stated: Why would not the M4 tank w/76mm gun make a good destroyer? Equal mobility w/M10 – more armor – more machine guns – a proved vehicle – termed the “best tank in the world”. Many observers have commented that the M10 has more speed than it was possible to use on the battlefield. An interesting question. And one which, in hindsight, had much merit to it. We can discuss that one in more depth later. Now, of course, every now and then, someone shows up to reinforce the stereotype. As a general rule, when I was a Lieutenant, I would generally do my best to be invisible to people above the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Frankly, as a Major, I generally still have such a philosophy. Such a thought process was not, evidently, in the mind of a 1LT Lyal H. Bate, of the 662nd TD Battalion, in North Camp Hood, Texas when, on the 31st May 1943, he wrote a letter to Major General Orlando Ward, Commanding General, Tank Destroyer Center. This was the cover sheet. Dear Sir: The attached suggestions for additional tactical  employment of tank destroyers are respectfully submitted for what value they may have. The ideas here mentioned may appear fantastic, but probably no more so than the basic idea of T. D. may have seemed as recently as five years ago. This is not the result of a sudden "brain-storm", but is a matter that has been given considerable thought over a period of months. I have taken.the liberty of sending this to youpersonally rather than through official channels for the following reasons: If the idea is sound or should lead to other related ideas, it must necessarily be kept secret. Or if a similar use is already being considered, the less known to others, the better. For the enemy to build a defense against this suggested employment, even if it were discarded, could disrupt other plans we might have along completely dissimilar lines. Respectfully submitted… Not a good start. The actual letter was as follows: Subject: Suggested Modifications for Additional Tactical Employment for Tank Destroyers To: Commanding General, Tank Destroyer Center, Camp Hood, Texas 1. The following suggestions for employment are based on recent successful experiments of others in under-water operation of the quarter-ton 4 x 4 truck and light armored cars. 2. In any landing operation it appears that attacking troops are extremely vulnerable during the time they are in landing barges and immediately upon landing on shore. It is during this period that they have no adequate covering fire, as the floating platforms of the navy and/or landing barges limit the accuracy of these weapons. It is believed that if a weapon were designed that could approach the shore with extremely low silhouette, or none at all, the chance of surprise would be greatly improved, and the number of' casualties in the initial landing operations materially reduced. 3. It is believed that the present M-10 tank destroyer or projected T-70 destroyer could be modified to meet these conditions. News reels have shown pictures of quarter-tons being landed in the surf and driven on shore with only the windshield above water. It is' also understood that the car armored, light, has been operated in as much as four feet of water. 4. It, therefore, appears possible that tank destroyer vehicles could be insulated to operate for short periods in as much as 30feet of water. Their crews could be equipped with breathing apparatus similar to that which is now used in shallow-water diving operations, consisting only of a helmet and oxygen tanks. It is believed possible that the present service gas mask could be converted for this use. 5. Given ideal weather conditions, solid bottom, and a sloping shore line, these vehicles, complete with crews, could be lowered to the floor of the ocean with the aid of long ramps or derricks under the cover of darkness or a smoke screen, and could proceed under their own power up to the shore. They would be invisible to any defenders until within point-blank range of the shore and in a depth of less than eight feet of water.Due to the 'adaptability of the vehicles, with their open turrets affording unlimited visibility, they could start firing once their turrets were out of water. This would present practically no target toany defenders and unless the shore were mined, there would be no way of stopping them from overrunning gun implacements, machine gun nests, and setting up an adequate covering fire of both machine gun and high velocity APC and/or high explosive shell, affording a protection to any landing barges that may follow behind. 6. While the writer has had no opportunity to experiment along these lines, it is believed that total emersion in the water would not affect the· gun or its recoil system and that the electrical systemsof the vehicles can be insulated against water. The exhaust and air-intake systems of the motors could be equipped with long, flexible hoses, the ends of which could be floated on the surface of the water by means of buoys. These would attract little notice from the shore, and once in shallow water, by means of a connection yet to be designed, the hoses could be disconnected and dropped off. 7. Suggested equipment for the crews would be a light woolen uniform, close fitting, that would quickly dry, a self-inflating life jacket to permit escape from -any vehicle that might stall while under water, and a standard type diving helmet or a modification thereof. Ammunition would necessarily be water-proofed and all parts of guns greased with water-proof grease, and while under water, breeches would be left open to facilitate draining. 8. It is recognized that ideal conditions would be necessary to effect a landing with such equipment, but such conditions do exist, particularly in the South Sea islands. But the element of surprise attained by such employment would more than compensate for the loss of any vehicles. An enemy, having no knowledge of such employment, would have no adequate means of defense short of a -heavy barrage of delayed fuse artillery shell and/or land mines placed on the beach. The latter would hardly be effective, as it would not be necessary for the destroyers to land on the beach to provide covering fire, as they could operate their guns in at least six feet of water. 9. One company of tank destroyers so equipped could afford sufficient protection for the landing of a combat team. 10. Request opportunity to experiment along these lines.   OK, Lieutenant. Just to get things straight. You have just written directly to the Commanding General of your entire branch, with an idea so important, so secret, that you don’t think that officers in your own chain of command are reliable enough to be entrusted with it, and that idea is to drive an M18 totally underwater along the sea bed, the vehicle so perfect for the job that the fact that the entire vehicle is filled with water is compensated for by the ‘visibility’ provided by the open top. Oh, and you want to sacrifice a TD for the experiment. I suspect it likely that you did try your chain of command, and they politely declined to endorse it. While stifling laughter. To his credit, Major General Ward replied on 5th June. Dear Bate: The more independent thought we can stimulate here the better. I am pleased. Your idea of waterproofing the tank destroyer for under sea approach of hostile shore I believe might much better be applied to a tank as it already has a top. Furthermore, the tank gun has less muzzle velocity, hence a more curved trajectory, hence more suitable for landing. One of the main reasons that a ship's fire is somewhat ineffective is on account of its flat trajectory. I believe your ideas are sound and possible of accomplishment but I don’t believe the tank destroyer is the weapon to start on. It may interest you to know that in landing at Oran one 105mm half track attempted just such an operation by jumping off into 25 feet of water, the Maracibo having grounded on a bar well out from shore. The gun, incidentally, is still there. At another beach where the Maracibo was grounded the rubber pontoon rafts were joined together and in a matter of a very short time the ship's whole cargo was on shore and fighting. , Actually the success of the Oran operation can be laid to the use of rubber pontoon equipment in getting tanks ashore. Its use with luck precludes the very complicated waterproofing now practiced. I suggest that you send your communication to the National Inventors Council, Department of Commerce Building, Washington, D. C., where the machinery is set up for analyzing suggestions such as · these to see whether there is a practical application. Sincerely, Orlando Ward, Major General, US Army  Commanding   Apparently LT Bate thought about this for a little bit, or else he was kept sufficiently busy by his chain of command so as not to have time to bother General Ward again. But on 3rd Sept 1943, he sent a letter to The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington D.C. At this point, LT Bate’s return address is now in 19th TD Group. 1. At the suggestion of Major General Orlando Ward, Commanding General, Tank Destroyer Center, and in compliance with par. 3, Sec. 1 WD Cir. #248, 1942 the attached suggestions tor modifications for additional tactical employment of tank destroyers is submitted for whatever disposition that may be indicated. It is unclear in the record as to what the Adjutant General of the War Department thought, or if 1LT Bate sent a third communication to the Dept of Commerce as MG Ward had suggested, but the record does have a copy dated Sept 14 1943 of a letter from the Dept of Commerce’s “The National Inventor’s Council”. Dear Lt. Bate: · The Council asks me to thank you for the suggestion in your letter of September 3, 1943, and the interesting presentation. Careful examination by our technical staff shows the distinctive features of this particular design ought to be given further consideration by appropriate authorities, and we hope to advise you later of any report or decision which may result. The circular enclosed is for your general information. We appreciate your patriotic desire to aid the war effort and inviteother ideas which you feel deserve attention. Yours very truly, /s/ L. -B. Lent Chief Engineer Enclosed is an extra copy of this letter which you may care to turn over to your Commanding Officer for incorporation in your service record.   There is nothing further in the file as to the further disposition of Lieutenant Bate.   You can go find my Facebook page here, my Youtube channel here, I stream Tuesdays With The Chieftain on Twitch (11am Pacific)