NATO Survey, 1943 Pt 2
Дата: 16.01.2015 06:49:17
favrepeoria, on Jan 16 2015 - 01:27, said: Actually the Germans were always more fearful of Patton than
Montgomery. They recognized him as the best General that the Allies
had on either front. He may have not been the great politician that
Montgomery was which led him into many unpleasant meetings with
Eisenhower, eventually leading to his dismissal as commander of the
Third Army. The route of advance of Operation Watch on the Rhine
was specifically chosen for a couple of reasons one of which being
it was thought to be too far for Patton to take any part. The_Chieftain: Was it 'Patton', or was it just 'the majority of the
Americans' in general? I'd be curious to see the source for this,
given that it would have been important to any attacking force to
try to attack more or less where two different armies meet to
reduce the chances of co-operation. Remember that the defense was
effectively in the British sector, which is why Montgomery was
given overall command of the operations to stop the attack and US
First Army transferred to Monty's control. Yeide's research into
the German planning process showed that of the two, the
German focus was on where Montgomery was. Granted, he does not say
it's because the Germans happened to fear Monty's leadership more
than anyone else's (Though he does say that for much of this time
the Germans didn't know who Patton was or where he was anyway), but
because his forces were always in the more threatening position
from the German point of view. Closer to the supply ports in North
Africa, with more experienced forces. Closer to the escape route in
Sicily. Closer to the channel ports in Northern Europe. Closer to
the German industries in Eastern France. The Germans dealing with
the Western Allies apparently always dealt with the British first,
and whatever was left over once that was done was sent to stem the
Americans.
NATO Survey, 1943 Pt 2














