Rants and Death Traps
Дата: 20.10.2014 09:54:25
SirBlackmane, on Oct 19 2014 - 21:47, said: I do in fact love the Sherman tank itself, and its many,
many variations (especially the Firefly), and appreciate its
tactical flexibility, but stating it was a match for Tigers and
Panthers is unrealistic. The simple fact is that it was, for
its time, an excellent mid-weight combatant, but due to a flawed
tank combat doctrine that refused to develop heavier tanks the
Sherman found itself forced into many unfavourable matchups.
I apologize if I seem overly critical, but the one of the
underlying (and oft-touted) points of Death Traps was that certain
commanders were happier to wastefully spend American soldiers'
lives rather than spend the time and money developing an effective
heavy tank. If you wish to prove that this is incorrect
(which the underlying concept is in fact true, even if the
specifics espoused in this particular book are not accurate) then I
would ask for a better argument than "The route that the US Army
had gone, with the equipment they had, and the tactics they had,
was working." from the people responsible for hamstringing regular
Tank development. Yes, they were winning, and did eventually
win, the war, but thankfully that was not done on the basis of
individual tank performance.The_Chieftain: But was it really a flawed doctrine? (If it worked, it can't
have been -too- bad...) You mention "wastefully spend American
lives", and I presume you are referring to the tank crewmen who
happened to find themselves up against German heavies, and died as
a result. But what else were the tanks doing? Rifle companies had
stupidly high casualties already, how much more would they have
taken had there been fewer tanks to support their attack because
the use of M6s or T14s had limited the amount of mediums available
to get to their battlefield? Had there been more heavy tanks at the
expense of mobile, reliable medium ones, would the Allies have been
as able to close the Falaise gap and prevent the enemy from
escaping, using their forces again and killing more Allied troops?
So many things have to be factored into the balance, it is
extremely difficult to say that the route actually chosen was wrong
or that any other route would have been better. American equipment
probably wasn't "shockingly inferior", as much as "shockingly
different"
Slash78, on Oct 20 2014 - 00:41, said: Was the US on the right track? Yes. Post-war
develops emphasized the need for medium tanks over heavy tanks.
That being said, it's ironic that TD Command dared boost
about how well armed and well off the US Army was as a whole when
they were an unneeded redundancy that prevented better armed tanks
from reaching the field earlier. Plans for a 76mm gun armed
Sherman predated the tank every seeing combat. It was
believed by Ordnance and Armored Command that a 76mm gun armed tank
was desirable no later then mid-1943. While the 76mm gun in
the M35 mount proved less then desirable, there was an attempt to
get the "M27" into production in July 1943 and a Sherman with the
same turret shortly after that. Both were blocked by AGF (ie,
McNair) because TD Command had just got their "ideal" Tank
Destroyer, the M18, into production with the very same gun. A
76mm armed medium tank was seen as an unwanted redundancy with no
perceived "battle need". And McNair wanted 3-inch towed
AT guns because of the false economy they would bring. (A gun
that was considerably less flexible than a SP mount and was wholly
undesirable in the opinion of the Infantry). The_Chieftain: I think the towed AT guns are a bit of a red herring in this
argument. It's not as if there was no place for them as a concept,
after all, they were used by all sides through the war, even when
they started getting to 76mm, 88mm or 90mm in calibre. I'm
unconvinced that McNair delayed development of the 76mm gun
vehicles much if at all: McNair had a great deal to say about
procurement and deployment, but Ordnance's R&D section seem to
have had very little blocking them from building any and every idea
they could come up with and testing them out. The incredible
variety of systems that they came up with (which then were rejected
for one reason or another, it seemed that they just threw vehicles
against the wall to see what would stick) is testament enough to
that. I'll have a look at the early/Mid 1943 timeline when I'm in
the office tomorrow at my library, but from my scans of the records
on my hard drive, I'm not sure I concur with the effects of the
dates you list here. Armored Force were quite adamant in mid-April
1943 (after viewing the M34A1 mount 76mm M4 in Aberdeen) that
Ordnance should stop trying to send them quick-fix solutions to
mounting the 76mm, build "a properly engineered turret", and that
that T20 idea Barnes mentioned he had started a program to
look into the month prior would be a good place to start. From when
the M4E6 pilots were delivered in June, through when they had
passed muster with Armored Force to when Army Service Forces said
"OK, we'll go into full scale production" in September took less
than three months. That's pretty reasonable going.
Quote 3-inch Armed tracked TD by mid-1942. 3-inch Turreted TD by late 1942/early 1943 (this happened due to McNair, so he wasn't all bad) 90mm armed TD sometime in 1943 76mm Armed Medium tank mid-1943 or shortly after 90mm Armed Medium early 1944
The_Chieftain: I'm not sure that timeline is feasible. There were a number
of attempts to make tracked 3" TDs (M5, T24, T40, T56/57 et al),
all were unsatisfactory, plus a few attempts at wheeled ones. T35
(M10) was the first tracked 3" TD designed which actually worked.
It wasn't due to any lack of emphasis on making the things.
Similarly, the timeline for 90mm TD seems unreasonable given one
AGF requirment which I don't think is out of line: They wanted the
heck tested out of things before they built and shipped them to
Europe. There was about a 6-week vacillation period in early 1943
where the (eventually T71/M36) program stalled, it restarted again
in May with the signing of the contract to design and build the two
pilots being signed with Chrysler. T71 #1 was delivered by Ford on
6SEP43, at which point Aberdeen started playing with it until late
October. Then Tank Destroyer Command got to play with it. And then
Armored Force got to play with it. (The second pilot went to both
latter locations as well, it seems). In any case, by the time all
the users had thrown in their two cents, the modifications made and
verified, and the final design approved for production, it was
mid 44. Even if they built more pilots initially to speed up the
testing process, and you drop that 6-week delay in 1943, there
is little likelihood of the design being finalised before early
1944. What would be the development process that you postulate for
a 90mm medium in early 44?
Quote Except all the replacements weren't crap. I can understand not wanting to send the T23E3 over to Europe after July 1944 because a lack of trained maintenance personnel, though why did the Army produce them starting in November 1943 and still have absolutely no one that could do maintenance on them.
The_Chieftain: Mmm... I'd like a citation for that. I've a report from
Ordnance saying that T23 was rejected, amongst other reasons, due
to poor cooling characteristics. A problem which Aberdeen was still
testing in early 1944, and I have even a report from Aberdeen that
it still hadn't been figured out by late 1945 (Tests on T23 cooling
continued through July 1946). In any case, unless Armored Force
were confident that the vehicle was reliable, they did not want the
thing shipped out to begin with: They didn't want the need for the
maintenance man-hours.
Quote Likewise the issues with the T25/T26 were well know, yet from from the prototype, through limited production in February-April 1944 and even until full production started in November 1944, none of the problems were fixed. Because they were unfixable? Or because AGF kept kicking the can down the road and fixing a design that AGF didn't want (though Armored Command lobbied for) was a low priority? In fact it wasn't fixed until M26s were rebuilt into the M46 starting in late 1949.
The_Chieftain: Could they have been fixable? Were the AV1790 and
cross-drive transmission in a battlefield-ready state in late 1944?
I'm not convinced that they were.
Quote As for the 76mm armed Shermans, yes, they sat in England until it was painfully obvious they were needed. The excuse is that none of the commanders wanted them. Of course not. None of the US armored units that fought in Normandy fought in any campaign since Sicily (ie, any battles in nearly a year). And that's not counting freshly trained divisions that hadn't fought at all to that point.
The_Chieftain: I don't argue that at all. But that was a local decision,
not one made by AGF or Ordnance when it came to designing and
building the things.
Rants and Death Traps














