Sherman PR, 1942
Дата: 19.09.2014 21:51:57
The_Chieftain:
Hidden in the depths of one of the back boxes of
Ordnance's archive materials is a small folder entitled "Press
Release." Given the contents of that folder, I can only assume that
the segments which follow had been extracted from field reports for
use in either the media, or Congress, to blow Ordnance's trumpet.
The purpose of the collection, however, and the fact that they are
generally all cherry-picked good stuff (the page for 1944 which I
may put up later does actually state some negatives), does not,
however, mean that the source information was wrong, or that the
people making the reports did not honestly mean what they said when
they reported them. So, in order that these words don't languish
unseen again by human eyes, I present them below as extract and
citation The entiire group below was collated December 11
1942. Confirmation has been received by reports from the Western
Desert, indicating great satisfaction with the M4 Medium Tank
(Sherman). The position of the main gun in the turret has made
possible the advantage of maximum cover in “hull down” position in
addition to good observation by the tank commander. There is
concrete evidence that the enemy tanks, including the special PzKw
IV (with the long-barrelled higher velocity 75mm gun) has been
destroyed up to ranges of 2,000 yards. All troops are indicating
that there should be more Shermans sent out at the earliest
opportunity. At the present moment there is no information
regarding the use of the stabilizer, and it is not expected that
this will be available early as it is still the policy to fire from
stationary ‘hull down’ position whenever the opportunity
permits. (Paraphrase of a cable received in Washington Nov 1
1942 from Major General, Middle East, to B.A.S. Washington).
Users are giving unstinted praised to all American equipment,
particularly M4, which embodies all desired improvements except
ideal gun sights. Would again stress it is vital we receive
earliest large numbers M4 regardless of the availability of tools
and spares for which we are prepared to wait. (Extracts from
Middle East Cable Q (AE) 63086) The Tanks M4 have made
a great impression on everyone, and the troops are thrilled with
them. The long gun is magnificent, both in accuracy and in
penetration, and the sights are evidently a considerable
improvement on the Grant. (Extract from letter to BAS
Washington from Major General, AFV, Middle East)
The Special Mk IV enemy tanks are being destroyed with
M61 ammunition at ranges up to 2,000 yards. According to first
reports from the Western Desert, the Shermans are excellent. There
is maximum concealment in the ‘hull down’ position and the
commander has good observation. The 105mm Gun Motor Carriages and
ammunition have proven very satisfactory. Although they have not
been used in a very mobile role as yet, great results are expected
in use against enemy guns. (Paraphrase of the Prime Minister’s
message to the President, October 30 1942) In continuance of
my last cable relating to the Medium Tank M4 (Sherman) further
reports confirm satisfaction. Emphasis is placed on the extremely
tough nature of the fighting during the period 24th to
28th October. Mines, anti-tank guns and very heavy
concentrations of artillery fire restricted tank movements until
such time as a combined infantry and tank attack on the night of
November 1st-2nd opened up a clear road. However, the period
of close fighting wore out the enemy’s armored and anti-tank gun
strength, so that our armor had a decisive superiority in the final
action between armor on the 4th November. Many of our tank
casualties were due to mines and shelling which affected the tracks
and suspensions only. Enemy APHE which penetrated our tanks caused
fuel and cordite fires. All evidence shows that gasoline causes an
instantaneous fire whilst diesel fuel ignites more slowly and gives
crew a better chance of evacuation. An investigation is in hand as
to whether many tanks might be saved if the ammunition bins are
more heavily armoured even at the expense of the number of rounds
carried. It is estimated that 50 medium tanks (M4) and 30 medium
tanks (M3) have been written off as damaged beyond repair. There
are 75 Medium Tanks (M4) and 60 Medium Tanks (M3) which have been
recovered and repairable. Exact figures will be sent when the
battlefield is cleared. Information to date shows that little use
was made of the stabilizer during the static fighting which is
described in paragraph 1. No information is on hand at present
regarding its use during the more mobile operations which have
taken place since that date.(Paraphrase of a cable from the Major
General, AFV Middle East, to the Director of Armored Fighting
Vehicles, War Office. Received 12 November 1942)
General Grant’s armor is most effective against 50mm
fire and this tank can outgun and reduce these smaller A/T guns
with ease. Considered at least equal to German Mk IV in all
respects (Paraphrase of cable from Cairo to Milid, No 1158,
June 21 1942 Captured German diary reads “Tommy is using an
American tank (M4 medium) which has incredible armor and very good
armament. (Paraphrase of cable from Cairo to Milid, No 1131,
June 15 1942) Crews loud in their praise of American
Mediums. I talked with tank commanders who claimed 8 German tanks
to their credit, and whose tank had been hit as high as 12 times by
50mm and even 88mm. (Paraphrase of cable from Cairo to Milid
no 1090, Part II, June 1 1942. Unofficial – American medium
tank is reported as magnificent. Crews have great confidence in
them. So far as reported, mediums have not been penetrated from the
front. By maneuver of artillery and 75mm of medium tanks 88mm A/T
guns have been silenced. (Paraphrase of cable from Cairo to
Milid no 1076, Part II, Mey 30 1942) Results of the test
show the (US M3 Light) tank to be highly satisfactory mechanically
for desert warfare (Extract from Tests and Modifications for
the US M3 light tank from the Mechanization Experimental
Establishment, Middle East)
The all round performance of the US M3 Medium Tank,
the light tank, the scout car and the Bantam car has been pleasing
to all the officers I have seen and talked to. (Paraphrase of cable
from Cairo dated March 31 1942, signed Fellers) The American
tank has done wonderfully well mechanically. They (The British in
the Middle East) have have very little trouble with it. (Extract
from Middle East Letter dated December 14 1941) The battle
performance of American M3 light tanks has proven superior to that
of the British cruiser tanks in the present Libyan campaign.
Official confirmation of this is given in the records of the
British 7th Armored Division. This superior performance of the
American M3 light tanks over the British cruiser tanks may have
been the primary cause of orders being issued for the destruction
of the official reports of the 4th Armored Brigade….
Unofficially, I have ascertained from British officers who found in
the November-December campaign that they have a preference for the
American tanks (Extract from paraphrase of secret message from
M.A. Cairo dated February 23 1942 and signed Fellers)
Mechanical failures were responsible for a large proportion of 104
tanks lost by this Brigade (2nd Armored) in its retirement
from MSUS, but only 1 American M4 was included in the group that
failed mechanically. (Extract from paraphrase of secred message
from M.A. Cairo dated March 18 1942 and signed Fellers)
According to Brigadier Gatehouse (commanding 4th Armored
Brigade, which operated 166 American M3 lgiht tanks) his American
tanks were engaged 23 times with German armored units between
November 19th and December 17th 1941. During this period
only 12 American tanks were lost due to mechanical failure, and the
tank far exceeded fondest expectations of the British. The American
tank is the most reliable tank on the Western Desert. (Notes
based on conversation of Brig Gatehouse with Lt Ahee on 21 February
1942) High ranking British tank officer of 4th Armored
Brigade reports 32 days of continuous battle operations, during
which time for care and maintenance was nil, with only 12
mechanical failures of US M3 light tanks. Said every officer and
man in his unit was enthusiastic about the Light Tank M3. He wants
American tanks and nothing else…. He is now prepared to accept the
tanks as they come from America without further modification. Even
though outranged by more powerful weapons, he had nothing but
praise for the 37mm gun…. He had 47 disabled tanks repaired and
returned to his unit by division maintenance personnel in the first
week of the campaign. First time in his career this had happened.
British tanks once out are out for the show. (Extract from
study written by Maj Joseph Colby, Ord Dept, on observations from
Libyan Theatre, December 1941) My British soldier driver,
who belongs to the 4th Hussars, confessed to me the British
soldiers all loathed the British cruiser and wanted only the
American tank. (Also Colby) All of the British
Personnel with whom I have talked are enthusiastic about the Grant
tank. (Obs of Colonel Purdue, June 11-June 19 1942). Under no
consideration should our tanks be modified to reduce the machine
gun fire-power which is frequently essential, is extremely
effective and with training can become deadly
accurate. (Comment in endorsement to Colby’s report by Col
Bonner F Feller, GSC, Military Attache)
Finally, there was a letter from the Soviets. Dear
General Christmas: I am very sorry for the delay in replying to
your letter of Oct. 20th, 1942 in regard to the performance of
American made tanks in our country. Undoubtedly you will understand
that since an article by an American correspondent, Leland Stowe,
was published in the newspapers, this question has become very
serious, and inasmuch as you asked us to give you our official
opinion, it was necessary for me to consider this question in
detail. Except for certain disadvantages which I mentioned in my
letter of August 11th, 1942, the American made tanks have
advantages which I would like to stress: 1. Good performance of
transmission and engine assembly. 2. Considerable firing power. 3.
Satisfactory armored protection of turret and front part of bow of
medium Tank M3. 4. Sufficient cruising range of Medium tank 5.
Satisfactory visibility. 6. Great mobility and good maneuverability
of Light Tank M3 which is due to the lightness of the engine.
It is well known that it is inpossible to design a universal
vehicle sufficient to meet every condition, and each one of
the existing tank models possesses some good features and some
disadvantages. It would not be right to come to a conclusion that
American made Tanks are not effective in our country. I feel
confident that the Mediun Tank M4A2 with diesel engine which we are
now getting upon arrival in the USSR will prove superior in combat
action to the Medium Tank M3 of an old design which we now have in
action in our country. I sincerely trust that the publishing of
Leland Stowe’s article will in no way influence your department
which is now at work on the designs of combat vehicles. Thanking
you for your co-operation, I am
Sincerely yours, I.
Belyaev Major General
Chairman, Soviet
Purchasing Commission in the United States. I would be
curious to read Mr Stowe's article, if anyone could track it down.
There was another collection of observations, dated at the end of
the war, but I'll come back to those. Track me down
on Facebook and
sometimes I even stream
on Twitch.
Hidden in the depths of one of the back boxes of
Ordnance's archive materials is a small folder entitled "Press
Release." Given the contents of that folder, I can only assume that
the segments which follow had been extracted from field reports for
use in either the media, or Congress, to blow Ordnance's trumpet.
The purpose of the collection, however, and the fact that they are
generally all cherry-picked good stuff (the page for 1944 which I
may put up later does actually state some negatives), does not,
however, mean that the source information was wrong, or that the
people making the reports did not honestly mean what they said when
they reported them. So, in order that these words don't languish
unseen again by human eyes, I present them below as extract and
citation The entiire group below was collated December 11
1942. Confirmation has been received by reports from the Western
Desert, indicating great satisfaction with the M4 Medium Tank
(Sherman). The position of the main gun in the turret has made
possible the advantage of maximum cover in “hull down” position in
addition to good observation by the tank commander. There is
concrete evidence that the enemy tanks, including the special PzKw
IV (with the long-barrelled higher velocity 75mm gun) has been
destroyed up to ranges of 2,000 yards. All troops are indicating
that there should be more Shermans sent out at the earliest
opportunity. At the present moment there is no information
regarding the use of the stabilizer, and it is not expected that
this will be available early as it is still the policy to fire from
stationary ‘hull down’ position whenever the opportunity
permits. (Paraphrase of a cable received in Washington Nov 1
1942 from Major General, Middle East, to B.A.S. Washington).
Users are giving unstinted praised to all American equipment,
particularly M4, which embodies all desired improvements except
ideal gun sights. Would again stress it is vital we receive
earliest large numbers M4 regardless of the availability of tools
and spares for which we are prepared to wait. (Extracts from
Middle East Cable Q (AE) 63086) The Tanks M4 have made
a great impression on everyone, and the troops are thrilled with
them. The long gun is magnificent, both in accuracy and in
penetration, and the sights are evidently a considerable
improvement on the Grant. (Extract from letter to BAS
Washington from Major General, AFV, Middle East)
The Special Mk IV enemy tanks are being destroyed with
M61 ammunition at ranges up to 2,000 yards. According to first
reports from the Western Desert, the Shermans are excellent. There
is maximum concealment in the ‘hull down’ position and the
commander has good observation. The 105mm Gun Motor Carriages and
ammunition have proven very satisfactory. Although they have not
been used in a very mobile role as yet, great results are expected
in use against enemy guns. (Paraphrase of the Prime Minister’s
message to the President, October 30 1942) In continuance of
my last cable relating to the Medium Tank M4 (Sherman) further
reports confirm satisfaction. Emphasis is placed on the extremely
tough nature of the fighting during the period 24th to
28th October. Mines, anti-tank guns and very heavy
concentrations of artillery fire restricted tank movements until
such time as a combined infantry and tank attack on the night of
November 1st-2nd opened up a clear road. However, the period
of close fighting wore out the enemy’s armored and anti-tank gun
strength, so that our armor had a decisive superiority in the final
action between armor on the 4th November. Many of our tank
casualties were due to mines and shelling which affected the tracks
and suspensions only. Enemy APHE which penetrated our tanks caused
fuel and cordite fires. All evidence shows that gasoline causes an
instantaneous fire whilst diesel fuel ignites more slowly and gives
crew a better chance of evacuation. An investigation is in hand as
to whether many tanks might be saved if the ammunition bins are
more heavily armoured even at the expense of the number of rounds
carried. It is estimated that 50 medium tanks (M4) and 30 medium
tanks (M3) have been written off as damaged beyond repair. There
are 75 Medium Tanks (M4) and 60 Medium Tanks (M3) which have been
recovered and repairable. Exact figures will be sent when the
battlefield is cleared. Information to date shows that little use
was made of the stabilizer during the static fighting which is
described in paragraph 1. No information is on hand at present
regarding its use during the more mobile operations which have
taken place since that date.(Paraphrase of a cable from the Major
General, AFV Middle East, to the Director of Armored Fighting
Vehicles, War Office. Received 12 November 1942)
General Grant’s armor is most effective against 50mm
fire and this tank can outgun and reduce these smaller A/T guns
with ease. Considered at least equal to German Mk IV in all
respects (Paraphrase of cable from Cairo to Milid, No 1158,
June 21 1942 Captured German diary reads “Tommy is using an
American tank (M4 medium) which has incredible armor and very good
armament. (Paraphrase of cable from Cairo to Milid, No 1131,
June 15 1942) Crews loud in their praise of American
Mediums. I talked with tank commanders who claimed 8 German tanks
to their credit, and whose tank had been hit as high as 12 times by
50mm and even 88mm. (Paraphrase of cable from Cairo to Milid
no 1090, Part II, June 1 1942. Unofficial – American medium
tank is reported as magnificent. Crews have great confidence in
them. So far as reported, mediums have not been penetrated from the
front. By maneuver of artillery and 75mm of medium tanks 88mm A/T
guns have been silenced. (Paraphrase of cable from Cairo to
Milid no 1076, Part II, Mey 30 1942) Results of the test
show the (US M3 Light) tank to be highly satisfactory mechanically
for desert warfare (Extract from Tests and Modifications for
the US M3 light tank from the Mechanization Experimental
Establishment, Middle East)
The all round performance of the US M3 Medium Tank,
the light tank, the scout car and the Bantam car has been pleasing
to all the officers I have seen and talked to. (Paraphrase of cable
from Cairo dated March 31 1942, signed Fellers) The American
tank has done wonderfully well mechanically. They (The British in
the Middle East) have have very little trouble with it. (Extract
from Middle East Letter dated December 14 1941) The battle
performance of American M3 light tanks has proven superior to that
of the British cruiser tanks in the present Libyan campaign.
Official confirmation of this is given in the records of the
British 7th Armored Division. This superior performance of the
American M3 light tanks over the British cruiser tanks may have
been the primary cause of orders being issued for the destruction
of the official reports of the 4th Armored Brigade….
Unofficially, I have ascertained from British officers who found in
the November-December campaign that they have a preference for the
American tanks (Extract from paraphrase of secret message from
M.A. Cairo dated February 23 1942 and signed Fellers)
Mechanical failures were responsible for a large proportion of 104
tanks lost by this Brigade (2nd Armored) in its retirement
from MSUS, but only 1 American M4 was included in the group that
failed mechanically. (Extract from paraphrase of secred message
from M.A. Cairo dated March 18 1942 and signed Fellers)
According to Brigadier Gatehouse (commanding 4th Armored
Brigade, which operated 166 American M3 lgiht tanks) his American
tanks were engaged 23 times with German armored units between
November 19th and December 17th 1941. During this period
only 12 American tanks were lost due to mechanical failure, and the
tank far exceeded fondest expectations of the British. The American
tank is the most reliable tank on the Western Desert. (Notes
based on conversation of Brig Gatehouse with Lt Ahee on 21 February
1942) High ranking British tank officer of 4th Armored
Brigade reports 32 days of continuous battle operations, during
which time for care and maintenance was nil, with only 12
mechanical failures of US M3 light tanks. Said every officer and
man in his unit was enthusiastic about the Light Tank M3. He wants
American tanks and nothing else…. He is now prepared to accept the
tanks as they come from America without further modification. Even
though outranged by more powerful weapons, he had nothing but
praise for the 37mm gun…. He had 47 disabled tanks repaired and
returned to his unit by division maintenance personnel in the first
week of the campaign. First time in his career this had happened.
British tanks once out are out for the show. (Extract from
study written by Maj Joseph Colby, Ord Dept, on observations from
Libyan Theatre, December 1941) My British soldier driver,
who belongs to the 4th Hussars, confessed to me the British
soldiers all loathed the British cruiser and wanted only the
American tank. (Also Colby) All of the British
Personnel with whom I have talked are enthusiastic about the Grant
tank. (Obs of Colonel Purdue, June 11-June 19 1942). Under no
consideration should our tanks be modified to reduce the machine
gun fire-power which is frequently essential, is extremely
effective and with training can become deadly
accurate. (Comment in endorsement to Colby’s report by Col
Bonner F Feller, GSC, Military Attache)
Finally, there was a letter from the Soviets. Dear
General Christmas: I am very sorry for the delay in replying to
your letter of Oct. 20th, 1942 in regard to the performance of
American made tanks in our country. Undoubtedly you will understand
that since an article by an American correspondent, Leland Stowe,
was published in the newspapers, this question has become very
serious, and inasmuch as you asked us to give you our official
opinion, it was necessary for me to consider this question in
detail. Except for certain disadvantages which I mentioned in my
letter of August 11th, 1942, the American made tanks have
advantages which I would like to stress: 1. Good performance of
transmission and engine assembly. 2. Considerable firing power. 3.
Satisfactory armored protection of turret and front part of bow of
medium Tank M3. 4. Sufficient cruising range of Medium tank 5.
Satisfactory visibility. 6. Great mobility and good maneuverability
of Light Tank M3 which is due to the lightness of the engine.
It is well known that it is inpossible to design a universal
vehicle sufficient to meet every condition, and each one of
the existing tank models possesses some good features and some
disadvantages. It would not be right to come to a conclusion that
American made Tanks are not effective in our country. I feel
confident that the Mediun Tank M4A2 with diesel engine which we are
now getting upon arrival in the USSR will prove superior in combat
action to the Medium Tank M3 of an old design which we now have in
action in our country. I sincerely trust that the publishing of
Leland Stowe’s article will in no way influence your department
which is now at work on the designs of combat vehicles. Thanking
you for your co-operation, I am
Sincerely yours, I.
Belyaev Major General
Chairman, Soviet
Purchasing Commission in the United States. I would be
curious to read Mr Stowe's article, if anyone could track it down.
There was another collection of observations, dated at the end of
the war, but I'll come back to those. Track me down
on Facebook and
sometimes I even stream
on Twitch.Sherman PR, 1942














